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If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected
by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But
let there be no change by usurpation; for though this in one instance
may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which
free governments are destroyed. 1
-- George Washington's Farewell Address, Sept. 17, 1796
INTRODUCTION
Imagine, if you will, the following amendment to Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power to promote and regulate the
health, safety and general welfare of the people.
Such a "Twenty-Eighth" Amendment would, in effect, give to
Congress something the Founders' careful enumeration of powers in
Article I, Section 8, clearly did not envision: a general police power.
Imagine further that this Twenty-Eighth Amendment is not reduced to
words to which you can refer (such as those quoted above), but is in-
stead implicit in a series of Supreme Court decisions which purport not
to alter the constitutional text but merely to reinterpret it. Thus, al-
though the Court does not explicitly acknowledge its role in ratifying
this implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment (and in fact, likely would deny
it if confronted with the charge), 2 its decisions have nonetheless legiti-
mately amended the written Constitution.
"How is it," the astute reader may ask, "that without adherence to
the procedures of Article V-i.e., explicit approval by two-thirds of
1. See George Washington's Farewell Address (1796), in HmSToRic DOCUMENTS ON
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1787-1988, at 62, 68 (Michael Nelson ed., 1991) (emphasis
added); see also JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
POLIcAL THOUGHT 48 (1992) (citing The Farewell Address of September 17, 1796,
WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS: THE VIEw FROM THE TWENTE CENTURY 24 (Burton
I. Kaufman ed., 1969)).
2. See infra Part I. A.
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Congress (or an amendment-proposing convention) and ratification by
three-fourths of the states-such a Twenty-Eighth Amendment could be
a legitimate part of our Constitution?" In order to answer this question,
it has become fashionable, in recent years, for constitutional scholars to
argue that the Constitution can be "implicitly amended" by means other
than that provided by Article V.3 Perhaps the most notable and forceful
proponent of this implicit amendment theory is Professor Bruce Ack-
erman, who posits that the Constitution can be (and indeed, has been)
implicitly amended by a complex series of political events which cul-
minates in an agreement among the three branches of the national gov-
ernment that the Constitution needs to be altered-although on paper it
still looks the same.
Importantly, because any such implicit amendment is purported to
3. Article V states:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no
Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Sec-
tion of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of
its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
4. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
FOUNDATIONS]; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Consti-
tution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Storrs Lectures]; Bruce Ackerman, Higher
Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Higher Lawmaking];
accord Kent Greenawalt, Dualism & Its Status 104 ETHIcs 480, 481 (1994) ("The text of
the Constitution, with its formal amendment process requiring federal and state involvement
and substantial majorities provides the 'classic formula' for higher lawmaking. However,
despite common legal rhetoric to the contrary, the most important constitutional changes
have not occurred according to that formula."); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the
United States: From Theory to Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY &
PRACTICE OF CoNsTrrUnoNAL AMENDMENT 37, 50 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) ('[Tlhe
federal Constitution underwent massive changes in the twentieth century, but.., this hap-
pened, in the main, through non-Article V means."); Sanford Levinson, How Many Times
Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Ac-
counting for Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY &
PRACTICE OF CONSTITtrONAL AMENDMENT 13, 26 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) ("Central
to understanding the practice of American constitutionalism... is recognition, and con-
comitant theoretical assimilation, of the extent to which the Constitution has indeed been
amended-been the subject of political inventiveness-by means other than the adoption of
explicit text.").
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be an amendment and not a mere interpretation, Professor Ackerman
asserts that future generations of "We the People"--Justices, scholars
and citizens alike-should pledge our fidelity to such implicit amend-
ments to the same extent as the written Constitution.5
Sound far-fetched? It should not. Broad judicial construction of
the power to regulate commerce,6 particularly since the New Deal, has,
in the eyes of many (if not most) legal scholars, effectively given Con-
gress a general police power.7 Thus, although invisible to the untrained
5. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4 at 288-89. Ackerman states:
[Leading government officials] must pledge to remain faithful to the new consti-
tution solutions even when the People turn their minds to other public and private
pursuits. No matter how powerful officials may be, they are not to allow the pres-
sures of normal politics to erode the meaning of these constitutional solutions.
And it is the special obligation of lawyers and judges to remind the powers that be
that they are only the People's servants, not the spokesmen for the People them-
selves-unless, of course, the political leadership wishes once again to take the
higher lawmaking path to win the mobilized citizenry's consent to another exer-
cise in fundamental re-vision.
Id.
6. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 253 (1996) ("In the 1930s the powers of the national govern-
ment were expanded in an extraordinary way, in favor of a system that exercised something
close to general police powers."); LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS & CONSTRAINTS 316 (1992)
("Justice Clark's opinion [in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States] gives Congress broad
powers to use the Commerce Clause as authority to regulate moral wrongs that occur in in-
terstate commerce. In this way, the Commerce Clause became one of the most powerful
weapons in the federal government's arsenal not only to regulate the economy but also to
use as a police power.") [hereinafter EPSTEIN & WALKER]; Jesse Choper, Did Last Term Re-
veal "A Revolutionary States' Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court?," 46 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 663, 669 (1996) ("[S]ome of the powers given, particularly the Commerce
Clause, at least as interpreted, are broad enough to allow Congress to regulate virtually all
aspects of human affairs."); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power,
73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1987) ("My conclusion is clear enough. I think that the expan-
sive construction of the [Commerce] [C]lause accepted by the New Deal Supreme Court is
wrong, and clearly so .... The commerce power is not a comprehensive grant of federal
power. It does not convert the Constitution from a system of government with enumerated
federal powers into one in which the only subject matter limitations placed on Congress are
those which it chooses to impose upon itself.") [hereinafter Epstein]; Joseph Lesser, The
Course of Federalism in America-An Historical Overview, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTING
BALANCE I (Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989) ("The reinterpreted [C]ommerce [C]lause has pro-
vided Congress with a national police power. When used in conjunction with the
[S]upremacy [Cilause, this police power can preempt any state regulation that deals with a
subject on which Congress has acted."); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal
Commerce Power & Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554,
554 (1995) ("[W]e have a collection of doctrinal rules that, if we take them seriously, allow
Congress to do anything it wants under the commerce power.").
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eye, the Twenty-Eighth Amendment may exist, just as surely as if it had
been penned by the Framers themselves. There are, of course, those
who disagree that the expansion of the commerce power is tantamount
to an implicit constitutional amendment, and instead insist that the ex-
pansion merely reflects the natural evolution of a vague text to meet the
challenges of a changing economy and society.8 Although this idea will
be explored, my point in this article is not to take sides between these
two views, but rather to examine one view-namely, Professor Acker-
man's contention that the New Deal Commerce Clause decisions did
amount to an implicit amendment-and determine whether, assuming
arguendo he is correct, his theory of implicit, extra-Article V amend-
ment is normatively desirable.
Why does Professor Ackerman insist that the New Deal Court
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is tantamount to an implicit constitu-
tional amendment rather than merely an altered interpretation? Why, in
short, does it matter whether we characterize the New Deal Court's
Commerce Clause decisions as an implicit amendment rather than
merely interpretive evolution? After all, Professor Ackerman argues,
his theory of implicit constitutional amendment is intended merely as
an interpretive theory, not a normative one.9 The answer is that it does
matter; it matters a great deal. By labeling the New Deal Court "switch
in time" an implicit constitutional amendment rather than simply an al-
tered interpretation, Professor Ackerman effectively insulates the New
Deal Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence from future, judicially-
instigated alteration. Thus, under Professor Ackerman's thesis, if the
present Supreme Court were to change its mind about the broad New
Deal vision of the commerce power, and such a change were not the
culmination of the same sort of "higher lawmaking" which preceded the
New Deal Court's "switch in time," such a change would be a counter-
majoritarian usurpation of the political will of "We the People" and
hence, illegitimate. I° It would be countermajoritarian, furthermore, be-
8. See Charles Fried, Foreward: Revolutions?, 109 HARv. L. REV. 13, 33 (1995)
(stating that "[tihe [New Deal] revolution was social or political, but not constitutional");
Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 488-89 (noting that the New Dealers may well have believed
they were merely changing course toward a better interpretation of the Commerce Clause
rather than toward an implicit amendment process). See generally Robert L. Stem, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
9. See Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETmCS 516, 517 (1994).
10. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 284. Ackerman states that
[T]here is danger involved in the informality of the process by which the New
Deal translated constitutional politics into constitutional law. Given the precedent
144 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 48:139
cause Professor Ackerman's thesis asserts that implicit amendments
such as the Twenty-Eighth Amendment are the product of majoritarian
political will--"higher lawmaking"-as evidenced by political events
preceding the implicit amendment's adoption."'
Furthermore, if we accept Professor Ackerman's theory, our ac-
ceptance says something about the concept of constitutional fidelity
which may-indeed should-make us uncomfortable. Specifically, to
what should we, as citizens, jurists and lawmakers, pledge our fidelity if
we embrace Professor Ackerman's theory? The ineluctable answer is
that, if we accept that there may be (or are) legitimate, implicit consti-
tutional amendments, the Constitution to which we pledge fidelity nec-
essarily extends beyond the written text to inchoate, unwritten policies,
the outer contours of which can be defined only by the subjective divi-
nation of unelected federal judges.
We should consider the possibility that Professor Ackerman's the-
ory, even if only descriptive or interpretive, may do more harm to the
Constitution than good. Although one may wholeheartedly agree with
the outcome of New Deal decisions and therefore desire to prevent fu-
ture, perhaps more conservative, Courts from undoing the perceived
progress made by the New Deal Court, entrenching those decisions by
imparting upon them the status of an implicit constitutional amendment
may be the undoing of the notion of constitutional fidelity or, indeed,
the notion that there is anything readily ascertainable to which we can
pledge fidelity at all.
In addition to the constitutional erosion which may result from a
legitimation of the notion of implicit constitutional amendments, there
is an additional danger posed by Professor Ackerman's alternative
amendment procedure. Specifically, Professor Ackerman's alternative
amendment procedures-both implicit and explicit--delete any role for
the states in the constitutional amendment process. If, as Professor Ju-
of 1937, some future Court may decide to embark on a "switch in time" without
the kind of broad and deep groundswell that accompanied it in the 1930s ....
Id. See also id. at 53 ("The constitutional precedents established during Roosevelt's second
term... may easily be abused by future Presidents with far more equivocal mandates for
fundamental change. So long as they can convince a bare majority of the Senate to consent
to a series of transformative appointments to the Court, constitutional law may be jolted
onto a new course without persuasive institutional evidence that a mobilized majority of the
American people endorse the change.").
11. Id.; see also Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 82 ("My central claim is this: If
and when these New Deal principles are radically transformed, debate and decision will oc-
cur through a higher lawmaking process comparable to the one led by President Roosevelt
in the 1930s.").
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dith Shklar says, the Constitution is essentially a reflection of our fears
about government (and derivatively, ourselves), 12 it follows that, by in-
corporating the concepts of supermajoritarianism and federalism into
Article V, our Founders erected a framework for minimizing their well-
founded fear of regional prejudice and majoritarian passion. Thus, any
constitutional amendment procedure that fails to require state input or
supermajoritarianism may leave our individual rights and our union
more vulnerable to usurpation and disintegration.
Part I of this Article sets forth Professor Ackerman's theory of im-
plicit constitutional amendment. Part II focuses on the New Deal
Court's infamous "switch in time" and attempts to discern the contours
of the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment "ratified" during this era.
Part III offers an extensive critique of Professor Ackerman's implicit
amendment theory, applying the theory to the implicit Twenty-Eighth
Amendment and analyzing its effect on the concept of constitutional fi-
delity, including the salient values of supermajoritarianism and feder-
alism. Part IV looks at recent decisions that may adumbrate second
thoughts about the legitimacy of the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amend-
ment. Specifically, I focus on the recent Supreme Court decisions of
United States v. Lopez,13 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,14 Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho5 and Printz v. United States,'6 in
which the Court, for the first time since the New Deal, has indicated
that there are enforceable limits on the congressional commerce power.
I shall explore the notion that the Lopez-Seminole Tribe/Coeur
D'Alene-Printz triad may signal a judicial retrenchment from the New
Deal Court's implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment and a re-commitment
to the constitutional text's vertical division of powers," possibly mark-
ing the beginning of a new era of constitutional fidelity and a repudia-
tion of Professor Ackerman's theory of legitimate implicit constitu-
tional amendment. These recent decisions may suggest that the steady
12. See generally Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM & THE MoRAL
LIFE 21-38 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
13. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
14. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
15. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
16. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
17. But see Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment? Lopez & Constitu-
tional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 845, 869 (1996) ("[T]he present constitutional
moment, if it is one, may involve the evaporation rather than the devolution of public
power. That is, power may not be flowing from Congress to state and local governments,
but rather going into thin-air or, more precisely, to private institutions.").
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march toward nationalism begun by the New Deal Court's infamous
"switch in time" has gone too far-has led us too far astray from the
constitutional text, past the boundary of reasonable "interpretation" and
into the realm of an implicit constitutional amendment which will no
longer be tolerated as legitimate. Thus, a judicial "repeal" of the im-
plicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment may be underway.
I. PROFESSOR ACKERMAN'S THESIS
Professor Ackerman contends that "intellectually serious people"
should reject the idea that the written, "ceremonial" Constitution is the
only legitimate source of constitutional law.'8 More specifically, he as-
serts that, in certain rare moments in history, "We the People" become
sufficiently mobilized to bring about an implicit amendment to the
Constitution by forcing all three branches of the national government to
agree upon a new constitutional structure.1 9 These rare moments of
mass mobilization are deemed "higher lawmaking," and are distin-
guished from everyday "normal lawmaking," by the fact that they are
periods of heightened political consciousness, in which average Ameri-
cans speak up and tell the national branches of government that change
is needed. 20 This two-track conception of lawmaking, which Ackerman
terms "dualism," permits him to legitimate judicially-instigated consti-
tutional turnabouts and avoid the "countermajoritarian difficulty" seen
by monists such as Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely, who acknowl-
edge only a single-track of lawmaking (i.e., normal lawmaking only).2'
Thus, Ackerman posits that when the Court "speaks during periods of
normal politics, [we must reject the idea that] we can hear the genuine
voice of the American people. Under such normal political conditions,
the political will of the American people cannot be 'represented' by
18. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 35.
19. Storrs Lectures, supra note 4, at 1056.
20. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 6, 285; Storrs Lectures, supra note 4, at 1022;
Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 65.
21. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 7-8. Ackerman states that monists believe that
"when the Supreme Court or anybody else, invalidates a statute, it suffers from a
'countermajoritarian difficulty' which must be overcome before a good democrat can pro-
fess satisfaction with this extraordinary action." Id. at 8. Professor Bickel is perhaps the
Dean of constitutional theorists who believe that judicial review of legislative acts is un-
democratic. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
On Ely's views, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REviEw 105-83 (1980).
146 [Vol. 48:139
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means of any such naive synecdoche. 22 By contrast, when "We the
People" act in the plane of "higher lawmaking," Ackerman contends
that a Court which then issues an opinion to reflect popular desires is
not acting undemocratically (i.e., in a countermajoritarian fashion) but,
to the contrary, is acting quite democratically.2
In order to identify precisely when "We the People" are acting on
the higher lawmaking track, Ackerman identifies a four-step process
which must take place.24 First, a constitutional impasse must occur, in
which one branch of the national government struggles with one or
more of the other branches for the right to exercise a power not given it
by the written Constitution.25 Second, there must be a national
"triggering" election in which those who support the constitutional al-
teration and those who oppose it fight for hearts and minds of "We the
People. 26 Third, provided the election indicates that a mobilized citi-
zenry supports the proposed changes, there will follow a challenge to
the institutional legitimacy of the branch opposed to the change. 2' And
finally, the implicit amendment will be realized if the dissenting branch
has a "switch in time" and changes its stance in order to save its own
legitimacy.
2
Ackerman claims that these four phases have been satisfied-and
hence, an implicit constitutional amendment (or "constitutional mo-
ment") has occurred--only twice: (1) the ratification of the Recon-
struction or Civil War Amendments;29 and (2) the New Deal Court's
"switch in time" with regard to the Commerce Clause.30 In both of
22. Storrs Lectures, supra note 4, at 1027.
23. See id. at 10. Ackerman states that "the dualist believes that the court furthers the
cause of democracy when it preserves constitutional rights against erosion by politically
ascendant elites who have yet to mobilize the People to support repeal of previous higher
lawmaking principles." Id. at 13. Thus, the Court may, consistent with democratic princi-
ples, strike down a law as contrary to a higher lawmaking principle until and unless the law
also has the backing of a higher lawmaking movement.
24. See id.
25. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 49; see also Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at
75-76.
26. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 49; see also Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is
NAFTA Constitutional? 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 875 (1995).
27. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 48-49.
28. Id Ackerman does not specify whether the will of the people may be divined in a
mere majority of the population as a whole. He does intimate, however, that the election
must result in a "decisive victory at the polls" for the reformists, in order for the holdout
branch to discern that the "people had spoken." Id.
29. See Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 72-79.
30. Id, at 79-82. Commentators have argued that additional historical periods may
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these instances, he contends, both the Reconstruction Republicans and
the New Deal Democrats were consciously going outside Article V to
effect constitutional change, in much the same way that the Founders
consciously went outside the Articles of Confederation in enacting the
Constitution. 31 This article will focus upon Professor Ackerman's para-
digmatic implicit amendment, the New Deal Court's "switch in time"--
the putative Twenty-Eighth Amendment.32
A. Supreme Court Precedents Addressing the Exclusivity ofArticle V
Before delving too deeply into the specifics of the implicit
Twenty-Eighth Amendment, it is useful to consider whether the Su-
preme Court itself has ever consciously pondered the exclusivity (or
'lack thereof) of Article V as a means for legitimate constitutional
amendment. In 1855, in Dodge v. Woolsey, the Court, in exploring the
breadth of the Supremacy Clause, stated that Article V was a mecha-
nism that Americans of the founding era had consciously imposed upon
themselves and future generations:
Nor does [the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution] end there. It is
supreme over the people of the United States, aggregately and in
satisfy Professor Ackerman's four-part scheme, such as the election of 1832 and the public
debate over the legitimacy of a national bank or the 1976 election and the issue of Water-
gate. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, I 1 CONST.
COMMENTARY 115, 142-43 (1994) (suggesting perhaps as many as I 1 such constitutional
moments); Tushnet, supra note 17, at 859 (citing MARK TuSHNET, RED WHrrE & BLUE: A
CRITCAL ANALYSiS OF CONSTITunToNAL LAW 286-87 (1988)).
31. Ackerman states:
[B]oth Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats [were] engaging in
self-conscious acts of constitutional creation that rivaled the Founding Federal-
ists' in their scope and depth.... Rather than merely following the marching or-
ders of the Federalists, both Republicans and Democrats were constitutionally
creative procedurally no less than substantively-and they knew it.
FouNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 44. On the alleged "illegality" of the Founding, see gener-
ally Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMErNTARY 57 (1987);
see also Storrs Lectures, supra note 4, at 1058.
32. Professor Ackerman's forthcoming second volume, We the People: Transforma-
tions, is primarily aimed at developing further his thesis with regard to the Reconstruction
Amendments. Suffice it here to say that, in passing the original Reconstruction Act in
March 1867, Congress required that Confederate States, as a prerequisite to readmission to
the Union, ratify the Reconstruction Amendments. See ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY &
THE AMENDMEN's TO THE CONsTrrUnON 50-51 (1978). Ackerman believes that the clash
between President Andrew Johnson (who adamantly opposed the Reconstruction Amend-
ments) and the Republican Congress (which supported them), and the intervening strong
electoral victory for congressional Republicans in 1866 forced President Johnson to switch
his position in order to avoid impeachment, thereby forcing Southern States to acquiesce in
the ratification of the Civil War Amendments. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 44-47.
[Vol. 48:139
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their separate sovereignties, because they have excluded themselves
from any direct or immediate agency in making amendments to it,
and have directed that amendments should be made representatively
for them, by the congress of the United States, when two thirds of
both houses shall propose them; or where the legislatures of two
thirds of the several States shall call a convention for proposing
amendments, which, in either case, become valid, to all intents and
purposes, as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures
of three fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three
fourths of them, as one or the other mode of ratification may be pro-
posed by [C]ongress.
33
In acknowledging that "We the People" knowingly selected an
amendment process that requires that both proposal and ratification oc-
cur via representational (as opposed to direct) democracy, the Court
suggests that other routes of constitutional amendment-such as public
referendum or judicial fiat-would be illegitimate. 4 This suggested
view of Article V as an exclusive means for legitimate constitutional
change appeared again in two 1920 decisions: Hawke v. Smith35 and
Dillon v. Gloss.36 In Hawke, the Court was presented with the question
of whether the Eighteenth (prohibition) and Nineteenth (women's suf-
frage) Amendments were properly ratified by the State of Ohio, which
had a provision in its state constitution requiring that all proposed
amendments to the U.S. Constitution be approved by the people of Ohio
in a statewide referendum. 37 In holding this state constitutional provi-
sion to be antithetic to Article V, the Supreme Court stated:
The framers of the Constitution realized that it might in the
progress of time and the development of new conditions require
changes, and they intended to provide an orderly manner in which
these could be accomplished; to that end they adopted the [F]ifth
[A]rticle.
33. 59 U.S. 331, 348 (1855) (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
36. 256 U.S. 368 (1920).
37. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 225. The Ohio state constitutional provision in question read
as follows:
The people also reserve to themselves the legislative power of the referendum on
the action of the [g]eneral [a]ssembly ratifying any proposed amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
Id. The case challenging the Nineteenth Amendment is reported separately at Hawke v.
Smith, 253 U.S. 231 (1920), but the Court refers to the prior Hawke case as the basis for its
decision. Id. at 232.
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... The framers of the Constitution might have adopted a dif-
ferent method. Ratification might have been left to a vote of the
people, or to some authority of government other than that selected.
The language of the article is plain, and admits of no doubt in its in-
terpretation. It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, na-
tional or state, to alter the method which the Constitution has fixed.38
Thus, contrary to Professor Ackerman's thesis, the Hawke Court made
it rather clear that Article V is an exclusive means of bringing about le-
gitimate constitutional change.39
In Dillon, the Court was asked to determine the validity of the
Prohibition (Eighteenth) Amendment.40 Specifically, it was argued that
because Congress had imposed a maximum seven-year time limit upon
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, the proposal itself was inva-
lid and could not thereby be legitimately ratified by the states.41 In
holding that such a temporal limitation did not affect the validity of the
amendment, the Court stated:
[T]he people of the United States, by whom the Constitution was or-
dained and established, have made it a condition to amending the in-
strument that the amendment be submitted to representative assem-
blies in the several states and be ratified in three-fourths of them.
The plain meaning of this is (a) that all amendments must have the
sanction of the people of the United States, the original fountain of
power, acting through representative assemblies, and (b) that ratifi-
cation by these assemblies in three-fourths of the States shall be
taken as a decisive expression of the people's will and be binding on
all.42
In so proclaiming, the Dillon Court was once again affirming the earlier
suggestion in Woolsey and Hawke that Article V was the exclusive
means of legitimate constitutional amendment. The Court's carefully
chosen language states that "all amendments"-not just some-must be
38. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 226-27.
39. See id.
40. 256 U.S. at 370-71.
41. Id.
42. Id at 374 (emphasis added). This language in Dillon appears to directly repudiate
the extra-Article V theory of Professor Akhil Amar, who asserts that the Constitution may
be legitimately amended by simple majoritarian popular referenda. See generally Akhil
Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994); Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Con-
stitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CQn. L. REv. 1043 (1988).
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ratified by the people "acting through representative assemblies"--not
through the Congress or the Court or the President-and that
"ratification by these assemblies in three-fourths of the States" would
be the only legitimate way to bind the People. 3
In the 1931 decision in United States v. Sprague, the Court was
again asked to decide the constitutional validity of the Eighteenth
Amendment, this time addressing the question as to whether the mode
of ratification specified by Congress-ratification by state legisla-
tures-was unconstitutional." More specifically, opponents of the Pro-
hibition Amendment argued that the selected mode of ratification-by
three-quarters of state legislatures-was unconstitutional because the
Founders had intended that amendments "conferring on the United
States new direct powers over individuals" must be ratified only by
state conventions, not state legislatures.4 5 They argued that the Found-
ers considered state legislatures to be "incompetent to surrender the
personal liberties of the people to the new national government" and
that, therefore, only conventions of the people themselves could prop-
erly ratify amendments depriving citizens of their personal liberties.46
In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
The United States asserts that [A]rticle [V] is clear in statement
and in meaning, contains no ambiguity, and calls for no resort to
rules of construction. A mere reading demonstrates that this is true.
It provides two methods for proposing amendments. Congress may
propose them by a vote of two-thirds of both houses; or, on the ap-
plication of the legislatures of two-thirds of the States, must call a
convention to propose them. Amendments proposed in either way
become a part of the Constitution when ratified by the Legislatures
of three-fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three-
fourths thereof....
The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distin-
guished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is
no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.
If the framers of the instrument had any thought that amend-
43. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 374.
44. 282 U.S. 716, 729 (1931).
45. Id at 729.
46, Id. at 729-30.
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ment differing in purpose should be ratified in different ways, noth-
ing would have been simpler than so to phrase Article V as to ex-
clude implication or speculation. The fact that an instrument drawn
with such meticulous care and by men who so well understood how
to make language fit their thought does not contain any such limiting
phrase affecting the exercise of discretion by the Congress in choos-
ing one or the other alternative mode of ratification is persuasive
evidence that no qualification was intended.47
Again, the Court clearly assumes that Article V provides an exclusive
means for legitimate constitutional amendment, concluding that the Ar-
ticle's plain language does not permit alternate modes of legitimate rati-
fication.48
More recently, in US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court
held that legislatively imposed term limits for members of Congress
constituted a violation of the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitu-
tion.49 In reaching this conclusion, the Court proclaimed:
We are... firmly convinced that allowing the several States to adopt
term limits for congressional service would effect a fundamental
change in the constitutional framework. Any such change must come
not by legislation adopted either by Congress or by an individual
state, but rather-as have other important changes in the electoral
process-through the Amendment procedures set forth in Article
V ... In the absence of a properly passed constitutional amendment,
allowing individual States to craft their own qualifications for Con-
gress would thus erode the structure envisioned by the Framers, a
structure that was designed, in the words of the Preamble to our
Constitution, to form a "more perfect union. 50
The Court thus emphasizes that, since term limits would "effect a fun-
damental change in the constitutional framework," the American people
may legitimately impose them in only one way: by a "properly passed"
explicit constitutional amendment using the procedures of Article V.51
By implication, any "fundamental" alteration in the Constitution can be
legitimately achieved only via the procedures of Article V, suggesting
that Professor Ackerman's alternative, implicit amendment method
would be viewed as illegitimate by the current Court.
47. IdM at 730-32 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
50. Id. at 837-38 (emphasis added).
51. Id
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Finally, the Court's 1997 decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores is in-
structive. 2 In this case, the Court held that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) violated the doctrine of separation of powers,
stating that "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be
'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means' .... Shift-
ing legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively
circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in
Article V. 3 The Court, thus, again implies that circumvention of Arti-
cle V's procedures-such as by legitimation of implicit amendments-
is normatively undesirable. 4
In short, an examination of prior Supreme Court precedents clearly
indicates that the Court itself denies the legitimacy of implicit constitu-
tional amendments.55 Thus, one of Professor Ackerman's central
ideas-that an implicit amendment is consciously "ratified" by the
branch of government making the "switch in time'' 56-is significantly
weakened. If, in other words, the New Deal Court would not have
characterized its "switch in time" as an implicit constitutional amend-
ment, why should ordinary Americans? Moreover, if the American
people were to assign a deeper or more significant meaning to the
Court's "switch in time" than the Court itself, the resulting incongruity
would inevitably breed disrespect for the Court and ultimately, the
Constitution. Any constitutional theory that encourages a deep divide
between the Court's and the people's vision of the Constitution cannot
be normatively desirable. Perhaps some would argue that these prior
precedents are not persuasive because the Court was merely paying lip
service to the old-fashioned theory of exclusivity, while secretly recog-
nizing the legitimacy of implicit amendments. One cannot know, of
course, what ideas secretly lurk in the minds of the Justices regarding
the exclusivity of Article V. But to embrace a constitutional theory that
would require that the Justices harbor secret beliefs contrary to their
public pronouncements is an exercise in extreme cynicism, not to men-
tion psychic divination. Thus, the more reasonable interpretation of
52. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
53. Id at 2168 (emphasis added).
54. This language also appears to refute Professor Amar's simple majoritarian, extra-
Article V amendment theory. See supra note 42.
55. See Dodge, 59 U.S. 331; Hawke, 253 U.S. 221; Dillon, 256 U.S. 368; Sprague,
282 U.S. 716; US. Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779; Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157.
56. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 51-52; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 80.
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these prior precedents examining the exclusivity of Article V is that the
Justices said what they meant and meant what they said.
B. Democratic Roots: Turning the Tables on the Originalists
Professor Ackerman does not acknowledge these Court decisions,
nor does he discuss whether the Supreme Court would agree with his
characterization of the New Deal Court's "switch in time" as a legiti-
mate, albeit implicit, constitutional amendment. Nonetheless, Professor
Ackerman asks his reader to believe that the New Deal Court self-
consciously switched its position on the Commerce Clause in order to
save its own institutional legitimacy, yet never considered whether its
decisions should be granted the exalted status of a legitimate constitu-
tional amendment,57 necessitating that future generations and future
Courts accord those decisions the same degree of homage as is ac-
corded to written amendments passed via Article V.
58
Although the New Deal Court itself may not have considered its
"switch in time" to be the equivalent of an amendment, Ackerman
urges his reader to grant amendment status, insisting that the New Deal
Court's decisions were deeply rooted in democracy-indeed, that the
genesis of the switch was democratic will.5 9 Thus painted, the New
Deal Court's Commerce Clause decisions take on a decidedly new fla-
vor-a democratic flavor-that ordinary judicial decisions lack.6 Be-
decked in such democratic armor, the New Deal Court's Commerce
Clause decisions become protected against assault by future judicial
decisions, which would be countermajoritarian and hence, illegiti-
mate.61 Professor Ackerman thus cloaks his theory in the mantle of the
Originalists, seeking to provide a degree of democratic legitimacy to
the New Deal Court's commerce opinions which ordinary Court opin-
ions lack.62 He then asserts that the Court cannot, consistent with
democratic principles, now turn away from the New Deal Court's im-
plicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment by any means other than another era
of higher lawmaking6 3 or what he terms a "constitutional moment."6
57. Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 80-81.
58. Id. at 82.
59. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 47-50; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 79-82.
60. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4; at 47-50.
61. See supra notes 10-11.
62. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 52; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 81.
63. FouNDATIONs, supra note 4, at 53; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 82.
64. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 56; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 86.
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Ackerman's theory not only permits the New Deal Court's switch
to sidestep the classic countermajoritarian difficulty, but it also avoids
what Ackerman perceives as two dangers inherent in Article V: "false
positives" and "false negatives., 65 A false positive occurs when a con-
stitutional amendment secures the requisite supermajoritarian consensus
of Article V, but does not, in fact, reflect the desires of "We the Peo-
ple."66 A false negative, by contrast, occurs when a proposed amend-
ment fails to obtain the requisite supermajorities under Article V, but
the proposed change is, in fact, widely supported by a decisive, mobi-
lized majority of citizens. 67
Ackerman fails to cite any examples of false positives. Although
perhaps a theoretical possibility, he cannot point to any of the twenty-
seven amendments enacted via Article V and proclaim that they falsely
reflect the will of the People. In this respect, then, one must presume
that Article V's procedures are working rather well. With regard to
false negatives, however, Ackerman implies that Article V produced
false negatives in both the Reconstruction and New Deal eras.68 Spe-
cifically, supporters of the Reconstruction Amendments and the New
Deal were unable to obtain the requisite supermajorities under Article V
despite widespread popular support for those reforms. 69 Thus, if vota-
ries of such change had "chose[n] to play punctiliously by the rules of
Article V, Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats con-
fronted the clear and present danger that their long and successful
struggle to mobilize the People for fundamental change would be stifled
by legalistic nitpicking [sic].,
70
Rigid adherence to Article V is thus characterized as "legalistic
nitpicking [sic]" which would suffocate the life out of a higher law-
making movement by insisting upon a "process [which] is so cumber-
some that it can serve as a safety valve [for the popular will] only under
the most extreme conditions.",71 Of course, Ackerman acknowledges
that if a political movement garners widespread support, its votaries
would likely be able to implement their desires via "normal lawmak-
ing," which requires only majoritarian-as opposed to supermajoritar-
65. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 278-80; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 85.
66. FOUNDATIONs, supra note 4, at 278-80; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 85.
67. FouNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 278-80; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 85.
68. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 47-52; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 79-85.
69. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 47-52; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 79-85.
70. Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 86.
71. Storrs Lectures, supra note 4, at 1057.
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ian-support for enactment.7  But relying on normal lawmaking in
such situations leaves the desired changes vulnerable to being ruled un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court, or perhaps worse, to being over-
ruled by future generations through the passage of another "ordinary"
law.73 Either way, reliance upon normal lawmaking offers little chance
of long-term stability.74 Thus, in order to ensure that a higher lawmak-
ing movement for constitutional change is not wasted-i.e., made futile
by passage of another law or a declaration of unconstitutionality by the
Supreme Court-Ackerman insists that, in "moments of grave crisis,"
Americans must be able to resort to procedures other than those in Arti-
cle V in order to bring about the desired constitutional change.75
If resort to non-Article V procedures is necessary only in moments
of "grave crisis," one must consider whether tossing aside Article V in
the name of expediency is wise. As political scientist and future Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson stated in 1885:
It is at once curious and instructive to note how we have been forced
into practically amending the Constitution without constitutionally
amending it. The legal processes of constitutional change are so
slow and cumbersome that we have been constrained to adopt a
serviceable framework of fictions which enables us easily to pre-
72. See FOuNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 9.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 69. Ackerman's theory seems somewhat
reminiscent of Sidney George Fisher, a prominent American lawyer of the mid-nineteenth
century who advocated that Congress, like the English Parliament, be given the power to
amend the Constitution in order to more efficiently respond to unforeseen emergencies:
But how can our Constitution be altered when the alteration is necessary[?] ...
[T]he exigencies of the future may require great and organic change; the best
opinion of the country may demand them .... and the necessity for them may be
obvious to all men able to think upon the subject, which nevertheless may not be
three-fourths of the people or of the States. Where, then, is the remedy?... The
provision in the Constitution for amending it has been called a safety-valve to
prevent the explosion of the people in revolutionary violence. But the efficacy of
a safety-valve depends upon the promptness with which it can be opened and the
width of its throttle. If defective in either of these, when the pressure of steam is
too high the boiler will burst.
SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONsTITUrIoN 25-26 (1862). There is a differ-
ence, of course, between advocating a parliamentary-style method of constitutional altera-
tion and advocating a method of constitutional alteration via a mobilized citizenry acting
outside Article V. My only point here is to note that both theories seem to hold--either ex-
plicitly (as in the case of Fisher) or implicitly (as in the case of Ackerman)-the procedures
set forth in Article V for constitutional alteration are perhaps inadequate in times of political
crisis.
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serve the forms without laboriously obeying the spirit of the Consti-
tution, which will stretch as the nation grows. It would seem that no
impulse short of the impulse of self-preservation, no force less than
the force of revolution, can nowadays be expected to move the cum-
brous machinery of formal amendment erected in Article Five....
But much the greater consequence is that we have resorted, almost
unconscious of the political significance of what we did, to extra-
constitutional means of modifying the federal system where it has
proved to be too refined by balances of divided authority to suit
practical uses ....
One such resort to extra-constitutional means in the face of a na-
tional emergency, according to Professor Ackerman, was the New
Deal's "switch in time," which will be discussed extensively in the next
section."
II. THE "SWITCH IN TIME" AND THE "RATIFICATION" OF THE IMPLICIT
TWENTY-EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In order to fully understand the importance of the New Deal
Court's "switch in time," it is useful to place it in historical context.
The Great Depression, which began with the crash of the New York
Stock Exchange on October 29, 1929, devastated the economy of the
United States. 8 In this desperate environment, Presidential candidate
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) campaigned on a promise of gov-
ernment intervention to stop the chaos. 79 The American people re-
sponded.80 In late 1932, FDR was elected President with 57.4% of the
popular vote, bringing on his coattails ninety-seven new Democrats in
the House and twelve new Democrats in the Senate. 81
By the time FDR took office in 1933, thirteen million people-
nearly one in four workers-were unemployed, domestic prices had
plummeted by thirty-seven percent, and the gross output of domestic
products had fallen by almost half.82 The centerpiece of FDR's recov-
76. WOODRoW WILsoN, CoNGREssIoNAL GovERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 242-43 (1885) (emphasis added).
77. See Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 80-82; FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 47-
50.
78. EPSTEIN& WALKER, supra note 7, at 281.
79. Id.
80. Id at 282.
81. Id.
82. Stem, supra note 8, at 653; see also EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 281
(stating that unemployment climbed from 3.2% in 1929 to 24.9% in 1933).
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ery program, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), was quickly
signed into law in June 1933, and established national minimum wages,
the right to collective bargaining, and maximum work week hours.83
Other key acts soon followed, such as the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), which required employers to bargain in good faith with prop-
erly elected unions,84 the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which limited
crop production in an attempt to increase agricultural prices, 5 and the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which regulated working condi-
tions in the nation's coal mines.86
Judicial acceptance of the New Deal legislative package was by no
means a sure thing. In the 150 years preceding the New Deal, the Su-
preme Court had let it be known that it was not shy about invalidating
acts of legislatures on various constitutional grounds including, most
notably, the liberty of contract contained in the Due Process Clauses.87
This was the basis of the holding in the famous case of Lochner v. New
York.88 Indeed, between 1899 and 1937, the Supreme Court invalidated
over 180 state statutes as unconstitutional, primarily on due process or
equal protection grounds.3 9
The first signs of trouble with the New Deal came in the January
1935 decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, which held, by an 8-1
vote, that certain sections of the NIRA regulating the oil industry vio-
lated the principal of separation of powers under the nondelegation
doctrine. 90 A few months later, on May 27, 1935, now known as
83. See Stem, supra note 8, at 653; see also National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L.
No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
84. See Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (repealed 1939).
85. See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (codified
at 7 U.S.C.A. § 601).
86. See Pub. L. No. 74-402, 49 Stat. 991 (1935) (repealed 1937). See generally
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 283 (listing the major pieces of legislation passed by
Congress as part of the New Deal).
87. See generally Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Ray A.
Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943
(1927).
88. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, as violative of the substantive due process right
of liberty of contract, a New York statute forbidding employment in a bakery for more than
60 hours per week or 10 hours per day).
89. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154
(1942).
90. 293 U.S. 388, 392 (1935). It is interesting to note that since Panama Refining and
Schechter Poultry, another New Deal decision, the Court has not found any act of Congress
violative of the nondelegation doctrine. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); see generally, David Schoenbrod, POWER wrrToUT RE_
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"Black Monday," a unanimous Court, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States (the famous "Sick Chicken" case), invalidated
the centerpiece of the NIRA-its requirement that industry trade asso-
ciations adopt "codes of fair competition"-on both Commerce Clause
and nondelegation doctrine grounds.91 With regard to its Commerce
Clause reasoning, the Court stated that:
Our growth and development have called for wide use of the com-
merce power of the federal government in its control over the ex-
panded activities of interstate commerce and in protecting that com-
merce from burdens, interferences, and conspiracies to restrain and
monopolize it. But the authority of the federal government may not
be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the
commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce "among the
several States," and the internal concerns of a State ..... "Without in
any way disparaging th[e] motive [of Congress], it is enough to say
that the recuperative efforts of the federal government must be made
in a manner consistent with the authority granted by the Constitu-
tion."
92
The fall of the NIRA did not portend well for other New Deal acts.
In 1936, in United States v. Butler, the Court invalidated the taxing
scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act because "[tihe act invades
the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and
control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated
to the federal [government]. 93 Also in 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., the Court invalidated, on Commerce Clause grounds, the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act:
[T]he effect of the labor provisions of the [A]ct... primarily falls
upon production and not upon commerce;.., production is a purely
local activity. It follows that none of these essential antecedents of
production constitutes a transaction in or forms any part of interstate
commerce....
SPONSIBILry: How CONGRESS ABusEs THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (providing
an extensive criticism of modem Congressional delegation of power).
91. 295 U.S. at 551; see also Dean Dinwoodey, The New Deal as the Supreme Court
Sees It, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1935, at E3; Franklyn Waltman, Jr., Roosevelt Sees Social Set-
back of 50 Years in Court Decision; Calls on People to Face Crisis; His Solution Not Yet
Ready, WASH. POsT, June 1, 1935 at Al.
92. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 549-50.
93. 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
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That the production of every commodity intended for interstate
sale and transportation has some effect upon interstate commerce
may be... freely granted; and we are brought to the final and deci-
sive inquiry, whether here that effect is direct.., or indirect. The
distinction is not formal, but substantial in the highest degree, as we
pointed out in [Schechter]. "If the commerce clause were con-
strued," we there said, "to reach all enterprises and transactions
which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate com-
merce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activi-
ties of the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic
concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal govern-
ment.
,94
The Carter Coal decision was the last time the Supreme Court invali-
dated an act of Congress as beyond the commerce power until United
States v. Lopez in 1995.95
The Court's willingness to strike the New Deal legislation angered
FDR and the New Deal Democrats, who considered the Court's deci-
sions to be against the best interests of the country. Shortly after the
Schechter Poultry decision, FDR held a press conference, the tone of
which was reported by the Chicago Tribune:
Conceding that the New Deal has been wrecked on the rock of the
Constitution, President Roosevelt today declared for a radical change
in our form of government. To implement the New Deal, the Presi-
dent pronounced himself in favor of curtailing, if not snuffing out
entirely, the sovereignty of the 48 states and clothing the central
government with unlimited control of agriculture, industry, com-
merce, and all other enterprises and occupations.... Taking advan-
tage of his press conference to deliver a homily consuming more
than an hour, from which flashed frequent caustic comments on the
Supreme Court decision that destroyed the NRA, Mr. Roosevelt sent
up a trial balloon on the proposition of remodeling the government to
save the New Deal.... The President's sensational utterances elec-
trified the country. The stock and commodity markets broke under
the impact of his pronouncement. It detonated in congress with dev-
astating effect.
96
FDR viewed the Supreme Court's reasoning to be fundamentally
94. 298 U.S. 238, 304, 307 (1936) (citations omitted).
95. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). United States v. Lopez, will be discussed extensively infra
Part IV.
96. Arthur Sears Henning, Roosevelt Out for Unlimited Central Power, Cu. TRu.,
June 1, 1935, atAl.
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incompatible with the welfare state the New Dealers had crafted to save
the country from economic ruin.97 Most Americans, judging by the
Presidential election of 1936, agreed with their President. FDR won the
1936 election with 60.8% of the popular vote and further strengthened
the Democratic Party's control over both houses of Congress.9" But an
ideologically divided Supreme Court permitted the so-called "Four
Horsemen"-conservative Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland,
and Van Devanter-to form the necessary majority, in many decisions
striking New Deal legislation, by winning over one additional moderate
vote, often Justice Roberts.99 Thus, despite a clear dominance of the
political branches of the national government, FDR appeared impuis-
sant to control the Supreme Court.
On February 5, 1937-notably after the 1936 Presidential elec-
tion-FDR announced a plan designed to give him control over the
wayward Court.1°° In his famous "Court Packing Plan," FDR asked
Congress to pass legislation authorizing the President to appoint one
new Supreme Court Justice for every sitting Justice who had reached
age seventy, up to a maximum of six additional new Justices.10' At the
time of this proposal, there were six Justices over age seventy; thus, un-
der the Court Packing Plan, FDR would have been able to add as many
as six new Justices, bringing the total membership on the Court to fif-
teen. 102 If he were able to appoint six new Justices, FDR would need
only two additional votes from the existing nine Justices to obtain the
majority necessary to sustain New Deal legislation.
Public and press reaction to the Court Packing Plan was generally
negative, and lukewarm at best even among Democrats in Congress."0 3
97. Id.
98. See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 282. The 1936 election gave the Demo-
crats an astounding 333 members of the House (compared to 89 Republicans) and 75
Senators (compared to 17 Republicans). Id.
99. Id. at 283, 294.
100. Id. at 294.
101. Id, at 294; Stem, supra note 8, at 677. See generally William E. Leuchtenburg,
FDR's Court Packing Plan: A Second Life, a Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673 (1985);
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court Packing" Plan,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 347 (1966).
102. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 294; see also President Sends Congress
Draft of Bill Proposed to Change Federal Judiciary: High Court Limit of 15 Proposed,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 6, 1937, at A7.
103. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 294-95; see also Gregory A. Caldiera, Pub-
lic Opinion & the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv.
1139, 1140, 1147 (1987) (revealing that a Gallup Poll taken of the American public from
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Undaunted, FDR took his plan to the people via a radio broadcast on
March 9, 1937, in which he made a plea as follows:
Last Thursday I described the American form of government as a
three horse team provided by the Constitution to the American peo-
ple so that their field might be plowed. The three horses are, of
course, the three branches of government-the Congress, the Execu-
tive and the Courts. Two of the horses are pulling in unison today;
the third is not....
... [T]here is no basis for the claim made by some members of
the court that something in the Constitution has compelled them re-
gretfully to thwart the will of the people.
We have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must
take action to save the Constitution from the court and the court from
itself. We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme
Court to the Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which
will do justice under the Constitution-not over it. In our courts we
want a government of laws and not men.
I came by a process of elimination to the conclusion that
short of amendments, the only method which was clearly constitu-
tional, and would at the same time carry out other much needed re-
forms, was to infuse new blood into all our courts. We must have
men worthy and equipped to carry out impartial justice. But, at the
same time, we must have judges who will bring to the courts a pres-
ent-day sense of the Constitution .... 104
Whether FDR would have succeeded in garnering congressional
approval of his Court Packing Plan is unknown. Twenty days after
FDR's radio address, the Court, in a 5-4 decision in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, upheld, against a due process liberty of contract chal-
lenge, a Washington State law regulating employment conditions and
Feb. 3 to June 10, 1937, consistently revealed that more Americans opposed than supported
the Court Packing Plan).
104. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 296-98; see also, Text of President's
'Fireside Chat' Defending Court Reorganization Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1937, at A15;
Text of President Roosevelt's Fireside Chat Urging Supreme Court Change, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 1937, at A6.
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wages for women.' s Justice Roberts, long an ally of the conservative
Four Horsemen, voted with the West Coast Hotel majority, providing
the crucial fifth vote.1' 6 Only a few months earlier, Justice Roberts had
voted to invalidate a New York law that was virtually identical to the
Washington law, intimating that his views as to the propriety of invali-
dating New Deal legislation had begun to change. 0 7 Less than a month
later, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Justice Roberts again
provided the crucial fifth vote-this time to uphold, as a valid exercise
of the commerce power, one of the remaining cornerstones of the New
Deal-the National Labor Relations Act.108 Justice Roberts' change of
heart in Jones & Laughlin saved the New Deal and thus has been
dubbed the "switch in time that saved nine."' 09
The Jones & Laughlin "switch in time" may be one of the most
significant constitutional decisions ever rendered because it provided
the basis for a profound shift from federalism to nationalism and has,
together with its progeny, effectively given Congress a police power-
the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment-to regulate any matter under
the guise of the original Commerce Clause. Jones & Laughlin, thus,
ushered in a new era of national power and laid the foundation for the
modem welfare state. Precisely how the Court accomplished this fun-
damental paradigm shift was, in a doctrinal sense, unexceptional:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to inter-
state commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be
denied the power to exercise that control. Undoubtedly the scope of
this power must be considered in the light of our dual system of gov-
ernment and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon in-
terstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in
view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the dis-
tinction between what is national and what is local and create a com-
pletely centralized government. The question is necessarily one of
[degree]." l0
105. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
106. Id.
107. See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 301. The New York case was Morehead
v. New York ex reL Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
108. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
109. EPSTEIN & WALKEI, supra note 7, at 301.
110. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
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Thus, the Court appeared to restrict the reach of the Commerce
Clause to those matters, including intrastate activities, which are
"essential or appropriate to protect... commerce from burdens and ob-
structions" and then, with due respect for our federalist system, only so
far as the Tenth Amendment would allow."' In this respect, the doc-
trine seems consistent with the Founders' concern about eliminating ob-
structions to the free flow of commerce among the states!12 Thus,
while Jones & Laughlin was itself doctrinally palatable in terms of its
coherence with the spirit of the Founders' vision, it proved, in hind-
sight, to be the pinnacle of a slippery slope towards nationalism.
If there were any doubts about the reach of the commerce power
after Jones & Laughlin, subsequent decisions made it clear that it was
virtually unlimited. For example, in 1938-only one year later-the
Court, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, extended the NLRA to a
utility whose activities were exclusively intrastate on grounds that some
of the utility's customers-such as railroads, airports, and telegraph
companies-were engaged in interstate commerce." 3 The Court rea-
soned that "it is the effect upon interstate or foreign commerce, not the
source of the injury, which is the criterion."'" 4 And in the 1939 deci-
sion of Mulford v. Smith, the Court upheld a new version of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act (AAA) which was grounded upon the com-
merce power rather than the taxing power, reasoning that agriculture
could be regulated as "commerce.""' 5 An earlier version of the AAA,
based upon the taxing power, had been invalidated only three years
earlier in United States v. Butler, on grounds that the regulation of agri-
culture violated the Tenth Amendment." 6 Thus, Mulford is significant
because it extended, for the first time, "commerce" to include
"production" (by allowing restrictions on marketing which in effect
would restrict "production") rather than trade in goods or services;
more importantly, it enabled Congress to accomplish its legislative goal
under the Commerce Clause' 17 despite the fact that, when the same end
111. Id.
112. The original purpose behind granting Congress a commerce power was to prevent
the economic balkanization of the states. See THE FEDERALIST No. I I (Alexander Hamil-
ton); see also RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 140 (1987); FEix
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY & WAITE 13 (1937).
113. 305 U.S. 197,220-21 (1938).
114. Id at222.
115. 307 U.S. 38, 51 (1939).
116. 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); see also supra text accompanying note 93.
117. 307U.S.at51.
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was sought under the taxing power, it was held to violate state sover-
eignty under the Tenth Amendment.118 It thus intimates, for the first
time, that the commerce power is unrestrained by the concept of feder-
alism embodied in the Tenth Amendment.
The intimation of Mulford became reality in the 1941 decision in
United States v. Darby, which explicitly overruled Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, and upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as a valid exer-
cise of the commerce power." 9 The Court stated that, "[w]hatever their
motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe
some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred
on Congress by the Commerce Clause,' ' 20 which was described as be-
ing "attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the
police power of the states.', 121 Having thus defined the commerce
power as the national equivalent of a police power, it should come as no
surprise that the Court then dismissed the Tenth Amendment as "a tru-
ism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."' 22 Having
concluded that the commerce power was plenary as to all its lawful ob-
jects, and that all its lawful objects consisted of all the objects of a po-
lice power, that which was retained by the Tenth Amendment was, syl-
logistically, nothing, because all had been surrendered.
The incredible breadth of the commerce power was illustrated in
two 1942 cases, Kirschbaum v. Walling," and Wickard v. Filburn.124
In Kirschbaum, the Court upheld, as a valid exercise of the commerce
power, the application of the FLSA to the employees of a landlord-
janitors, elevator operators, watchmen and carpenters, inter alia---on the
grounds that the landlord employer leased space to a clothing manu-
facturer who sold clothes in interstate commerce. 125 In Wickard, the
Court upheld the imposition of a penalty under the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act on 239 bushels of wheat grown above a farmer's statutory
allotment that were used to feed his livestock and family.126 Though
conceding that farmer Filburn's homegrown wheat was trivial and did
118. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
119. 312 U.S. 100, 116-17, 123 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918)).
120. Id. at 115.
121. Id at 114.
122. Id. at 124.
123. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
124. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
125. 316 U.S. at 518-19, 524-25.
126. 317 U.S. at 129.
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not itself enter interstate commerce, the Court nonetheless held that,
when aggregated with other farmers who grew extra wheat for home
consumption, "such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat
would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions."'
27
Interestingly, a book written five years before Wickard adumbrated that
decision with an eerily similar hypothetical illustration:
If a man plants a patch of potatoes in his back yard, he may feel rea-
sonably assured that he is engaged in a purely local enterprise. Yet
the more food that is produced locally, the less will be brought into
and the more sent out of the state. The patch of potatoes has an in-
fluence-slight, it is true-on the movement of food supplies. If
every activity which bears any discernible relation to interstate
commerce is subject to federal control, the commerce power has be-
come all-embracing. Congress could require a federal license for the
planting of potatoes.1
28
After Wickard and Kirschbaum, there was little doubt that the
commerce power had been significantly broadened, allowing Congress
to regulate at will. With this broadening of the commerce power came a
concomitant narrowing of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the
states any powers not delegated to the national government.129 In the
landmark 1985 decision of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that states' rights under the
Tenth Amendment "are more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limits on federal power."'"3 In so stating, the Court adopted a
narrow view of states' rights, in which national politicians-i.e., mem-
bers of Congress-are deemed trustworthy guardians of state interests
because they are elected by (and therefore accountable to) local con-
stituencies.", The concept of federalism was thus reduced to a proce-
dural, nonjusticiable question, leaving to congressional discretion the
127. Id at 128.
128. FREDERICK D. GoODwIN RIBBLE, STATE & NATIONAL PowER OVER COMMERCE
148 (1937).
129. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
130. 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985). See generally Jesse H. Choper, JUDICIAL REVIEW &
nm NATrONAL POLmCAL PROCESs: A FuNcTioNAL RECONSIDERATION OF TiE ROLE OF THE
SuPREmE COuRT (1980). Professor Jesse Choper is generally credited with being the most
persuasive voice for procedural federalism view.
131. 469 U.S. at 528.
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boundary line between national and state power. Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause thereby became plenary, turning the con-
cept of federalism on its head: rather than a national government of
limited, enumerated powers of which the Tenth Amendment prevents
encroachment, we now have a national government of unlimited, ple-
nary power of which the Tenth Amendment is reduced to a procedural
truism.
3 2
What law student, reading Wickard and Garcia for the first time,
has not furrowed his brow wondering how the commerce power came
to be such an omnipotent behemoth and the Tenth Amendment a mere
shadow? The answer, according to Professor Ackerman, is the implicit
Twenty-Eighth Amendment, which is asserted to be a reflection of the
conscious and purposeful desire of the people to realign national-state
power.
133
Ill. A CRITIQUE OF ACKERMAN'S THEORY
A. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
As an initial matter, perhaps the most obvious flaw in Professor
Ackerman's implicit amendment theory is that it runs counter to the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius---"the expression of one
thing excludes another." 134  While this canon is normally applied by
courts in the construction of ordinary statutes, it has often been applied
in construing various constitutions, 135 and logic would seem to warrant
132. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (describing the Tenth
Amendment as essentially a tautology); Lesser, supra note 7, at 9-11 (asserting that "what
we have today is a Congress that shows no reluctance in exercising a national police power
to regulate state and local governments as well as private parties, and a Supreme Court that
has abdicated its historic role as the ultimate arbiter of controversies over federalism").
133. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 44.
[B]oth Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats [were] engaging in
self-conscious acts of constitutional creation that rivaled the Founding Federal-
ists' in their scope and depth.... Rather than meekly following the marching or-
ders of the Federalists, both Republicans & Democrats were constitutionally
creative procedurally no less than substantively-and they knew it.
Id. at 40 (describing the New Deal implicit amendment as a "constitutional triumph of the
activist welfare state."); see also id at 53 ("If the American people were ever endorsing a
break with their constitutional past, they were doing so in the 1930s.").
134. Black's Law Dictionary 299 (5th ed. 1983) (abridged).
135. See, e.g., Head v. Head, 2 Ga. 191 (1847); In re Constitutional Convention, 14
R.I. 649 (1883); Carton v. Secretary of State, 115 N.W. 429 (Mich. 1908); People v. Angle,
17 N.E. 413 (N.Y. 1888).
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such extension. Applying the expressio unius canon to the language of
Article V leads to the conclusion that the expression by the Framers of
an explicit procedure for constitutional amendment necessarily implies
that all other forms of amendment would be illegitimate.
However, as Karl Llewellyn's landmark article on statutory inter-
pretation has demonstrated, the maxim expressio unius has a counter-
vailing maxim which states that statutory language may admit of other
ways or means "where some only are expressly mentioned by way of
example." 13 6 Yet, precedents invoking this countervailing maxim are
careful to limit its application to those situations in which the statute
has expressly indicated that the method provided is merely an example
or illustration. 37 Such is not the case with Article V; its language does
not expressly indicate that its procedures for constitutional amendment
were meant to be merely illustrative. Thus, ordinary canons of statu-
tory construction lead to the conclusion that Article V's procedures
should be viewed as an exclusive pathway to legitimate constitutional
alteration.
On a deeper level, the expression of an explicit procedure for con-
stitutional amendment without labeling it as merely illustrative indi-
cates an intended exclusivity because of the negative impact a contrary
interpretation would have upon the rest of the Constitution. For exam-
ple, were we to conclude that Article V's explicit procedures were
merely illustrative (even though the Framers did not label them as
such), what impact would this have on other provisions of the Constitu-
tion? Would other Articles concerning the organization of the Execu-
tive, Legislative or Judicial branches also then be open to the debate as
to their exclusivity? Would we, for example, then be able to argue that
the Framers did not intend Congress to be the exclusive legislative
body? Or perhaps that the failure of the Framers to mention a Prime
Minister permits the legitimate recognition of such an office? And
what of the Amendments to the Constitution, particularly the Bill of
,Rights? If Article V's explicit language can be circumvented, could not
the language of the First, Fourth, Fifth, or other equally important
136. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAD. L. REV. 395, 405 (1950).
137. Springer v. Government of the Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206 (1928); Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 611 (1927); Smart v. The Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability
Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 1995); People v. Reed, 914 P.2d 184, 190 (Cal. 1996); Si-
erra Club v. Department of Forestry, 275 Cal. Rptr. 243, 244 (1990); Marcolini v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 278 A.2d 796, 799 (Conn. 1971).
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Amendments? Could we not also begin "implying" into those Amend-
ments certain limitations or expansions not even intimated in their lan-
guage? If Article V is merely precatory language, are not other consti-
tutional provisions equally precatory? If so, the result is an ignorable
Constitution, a document rendered merely illustrative, its structure and
protections and rights transformed into shining aspirational goals de-
void of exclusivity, and hence, meaning. In short, if Article V's lan-
guage does not create exclusivity, arguably neither does the rest of the
Constitution's language, and the written document would no longer re-
quire or deserve the fidelity it has traditionally inspired.
B. Amendment versus Interpretation
Another shortcoming of Professor Ackerman's implicit amend-
ment theory is that he does not indicate why the New Deal Court's
Commerce Clause decisions are, in fact, tantamount to a constitutional
"amendment" and not merely reasonable evolutionary interpretations of
prior precedent."' While his four-step schema permits him to self-
select when he claims these implicit amendments have occurred, Ack-
erman offers no explanation as to why these implicit amendments are
any more "amendment-like" than other judicial decisions or political
events which arguably have brought about as much (or more) wholesale
change as the New Deal Court's "switch in time."'39 For example, who
would not agree that Brown v. Board of Education ushered in a com-
pletely new era of Equal Protection Clause meaning and analysis? 40 Or
that the Supreme Court's 180 degree turnaround in Baker v. Carr
14 1 _
only twelve years after Colegrove v. Green 4 2-was a completely new
conception of the justiciability of apportionment? Or, relatedly, that
Reynolds v. Sims offered a completely new view of Equal Protection as
138. Sandford Levinson, Introduction: Imperfection & Amendability, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 3, 3
(Sandford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Levinson, Introduction].
139. Professor Ackerman is not alone in this conclusion. Professor Griffin, for exam-
ple, contends that "[t]he crucial constitutional fact of the twentieth century is that all sig-
nificant change in the structure of the national government after the New Deal occurred
through non-Article V means." Griffin, supra note 4, at 51.
140. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown, of course, overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896).
141. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding apportionment challenge justiciable not on Guar-
anty Clause grounds, but upon Equal Protection Clause grounds).
142. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (holding apportionment challenge not justiciable under
Guaranty Clause).
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applied to the apportionment context?143 Or that the right to privacy
found in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments in Griswold v. Connecticut was a fundamental sea-
change? 144 And what of the Court's decision in Katz v. United States,
141
which adopted a fundamentally different view of the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure than its
prior decision in Olmstead v. United States?146 Or the Supreme Court's
1943 decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
which held that a compulsory flag salute law violated the First
Amendment,147 overruling an opposite conclusion reached only three
years earlier in Minersville School District v. Gobitis?14' These are only
a few examples of fundamental doctrinal shifts by the Supreme Court
which undoubtedly changed the "meaning" of the Constitution as much
as the New Deal Court's Commerce Clause decisions.
Indeed, it is enigmatic why Ackerman limits his concept of im-
plicit amendment to the Reconstruction Amendments and the New Deal
Court's "switch in time." While there may not be an identifiable
"signaling event" behind these various paradigm shift decisions, 149 they
were all arguably preceded by subtle or not-so-subtle changes in socie-
tal thinking-about race relations or the drafters' intentions with regard
to the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment-which presumably
enjoyed widespread support. But Ackerman suggests that they are
qualitatively "different" from the New Deal Court's "switch in time."
Although these decisions just mentioned do not fit neatly into his four-
step framework, it is doubtful that this is because the decisions are, in
fact, fundamentally different in kind. More likely, these other decisions
fail to obtain implicit amendment status because Professor Ackerman's
143. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that Equal Protection Clause requires apportion-
ment based upon "one person, one vote" principle).
144. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead and holding that invasion of rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, not physical trespass, triggers the Fourth Amendment's
search and seizure protections).
146. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding physical trespass a prerequisite for search and
seizure to occur).
147. 319 U.S. 624, 624 (1943).
148. 310 U.S. 586, 586 (1940).
149. With regard to Brown, for example, Ackerman states that "Earl Warren was per-
fectly aware that President Eisenhower's recent election did not mark the rise of an aggres-
sive new movement for constitutional reform.... At the time Brown was argued and rear-
gued, only one thing was clear: such a mass movement did not exist." FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 4, at 134-35.
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four-step schema is customized to legitimate and entrench perceived
"good" New Deal decisions and their progeny and thereby prevent re-
trenchment by future courts and generations.
Two such "good" New Deal Court progeny which become en-
trenched by Professor Ackerman's theory are Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation'50 and Griswold v. Connecticut.15 1 Professor Ackerman contends
that these decisions were not in themselves implicit constitutional
amendments but merely legitimate interpretations of the implicit
Twenty-Eighth Amendment.1 52 Specifically, he claims that, if one as-
sumes that the New Deal Court decisions implicitly amended the Con-
stitution, Brown and Griswold are merely logical extensions-synthetic
interpretations-of this implicit amendment. 53 Thus, Brown is consis-
tent with the New Deal implicit amendment which Ackerman claims
stands for the "new promise of an activist government," of which public
schools were paradigmatic. 15 4 The New Deal Court's rejection of the
old laissez-faire sentiment of Lochner, 55 therefore, paved the way for
the demise of the laissez-faire attitude in Plessy;156 hence, Brown is
merely a correct reinterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause fol-
lowing "ratification" of the New Deal implicit amendment. 57 Like-
wise, Ackerman posits that Griswold merely held that the New Deal
implicit amendment rejecting Lochnerian "freedom of contract" princi-
ples did not extend beyond economic regulation. 58 Thus, because the
Connecticut statute outlawing the dissemination of birth control serv-
ices addressed a social or moral, rather than an economic, matter, the
state government's exercise of power was still subject to the limits of
liberty of contract affirmed by Lochner15 9 Ackerman asserts, in other
150. 349 U.S. 294.
151. 381 U.S. 479.
152. Ackerman states: "My thesis: we can best understand both Brown and Griswold
as a continuation of the project of synthetic interpretation begun in the aftermath of the
Civil War in the Slaughterhouse Cases and redirected in New Deal opinions like Carolene
Products." FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 132.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 148.
155. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
156. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
157. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 150 ("Within the new activist order, the
schoolchild's sense of racial inferiority had become a public responsibility, not a private
choice. The Warren Court's decision to overrule Plessy was not only correct as an inter-
pretive synthesis, but obviously so.").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 153-54.
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words, that the Griswold Court, perhaps unconsciously,' 60 was trying to
tell us that Lochner's principle of freedom of contract was not entirely
dead; in the realm of non-economic matters, it was, in fact, alive and
well:
Douglas makes a crucial turn [in Griswold]. He views the courts of
the middle republic [i.e., the Lochner Court] as engaged in a valid
interpretive enterprise, and one from which modem courts can con-
tinue to learn as they tried to make sense of the Founding. Instead of
repudiating the entire Lochner era, he proposes a more discriminat-
ing view. He distinguishes between cases, like Lochner, that protect
private ordering in economic relations, and those, like Griswold, that
protect privacy in more intimate spheres of life .... Although the
New Deal gained the support of the People to regulate these
"projects" for the general welfare, Douglas refuses to read the New
Deal precedents so broadly as to include "bilateral loyalties" within
the sphere of governmental management. He can, therefore, still
mark out marriage as an appropriate context for re-presenting the
continuing constitutional value of liberty [of contract] inherited from
the Founding.
16 1
Ackerman buttresses his theory by pointing to the dissent in Gris-
wold by Justices Black and Stewart, which he says,
offer up a much broader interpretation of the New Deal than does the
majority. For them, the 1930s did not merely repudiate the constitu-
tional value of private ordering in "commercial or social projects." It
amounted to a rejection of the very idea that some spheres of life
should be insulated from pervasive management by the activist state.
On this statist interpretation the People not only decisively author-
ized their government to regulate sweatshops in the 1930s. They
also authorized state management of free choice in any and all areas
of life.
162
Ackerman's characterization of the battle between the majority and dis-
senters in Griswold highlights a primary weakness of his implicit
160. Indeed, as Ackerman acknowledges, the majority in Griswold explicitly rejected
the notion that they were basing their decision on the liberty of contract principles espoused
in Lochner. Id. at 154; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82 ("Overtones of some argu-
ments suggest that Lochner v. New York... should be our guide. But we decline that invi-
tation .... We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propri-
ety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.") (citations
omitted).
161. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 155.
162. Id. at 157.
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amendment theory: the difficulty, if not impossibility, of defining the
contours of the purported implicit amendment. After all, if, by defini-
tion, a constitutional amendment is "unwritten," where do we begin
when we want to draw the outline of its meaning? If we take Acker-
man's characterization of the opinions in Griswold as true, it shows us
that the Court was unsure as to the basic question of whether the New
Deal Court's "implicit" amendment was limited only to economic mat-
ters, or whether it was a broader repudiation of natural law, laissez-faire
limits on governmental power altogether. And while the majority in
Griswold, according to Ackerman, concluded that the New Deal im-
plicit amendment was indeed limited to economic legislation,163 his ex-
planation leaves one with the same distinctly bad taste that Lochner left
in the mouths of so many legal scholars: that the Court based its conclu-
sion upon personal predilections, not upon textual materials which
could help provide the contours of the meaning and purpose of the New
Deal Court's "switch in time." This, of course, should come as no sur-
prise, for if the New Deal Court's "switch in time" created an "implicit"
constitutional amendment, a fortiori there would be no textual materials
to which the Griswold Court could refer for guidance.
Ackerman's insistence on characterizing the New Deal "switch in
time" as an implicit amendment creates an inherent opportunity for (or
perhaps more precisely, requires) the Court to engage in the kind of
Lochnerian, make-it-up-as-we-go-along natural law adjudication sup-
posedly rejected by the New Deal Court. 164 Without a written textual
reference point from which to start, Ackerman's theory of implicit
amendment effectively gives the Court carte blanche to define the con-
tours of the New Deal and to deem those contours as supreme over all
"lesser" acts of government, including state and federal laws. In a very
real sense, this gives the Court unfettered power to strike laws as un-
163. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
164. Professor Ackerman acknowledges this problem, but, as his theory is merely in-
terpretive rather than normative, supra note 9 and accompanying text, he does not feel
compelled to dwell upon it, but merely states:
Since the [higher lawmaking] movement isn't forced to pin its transformative
message down in a formal amendment, the modem system relies very heavily on
the good judgment of courts. After making their "switch in time," they must re-
flect upon the deeper meanings of transformative statutes and seek to codify them
in transformative opinions that will guide constitutional development in the re-
gime ahead. If the courts fail to discharge this function sensitively, the system
will suffer greatly. Is it wise to rely so heavily on judges this way?
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 284. My answer to his last rhetorical question is, of course,
"no.,"
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constitutional that it feels do not comport with its fluctuating sense of
morality-a la natural law. This is precisely the sort of elitist Bur-
keanism that Ackerman claims he is striving so strenuously to avoid
through his insistence that the New Deal Court "switch in time" ema-
nates from "We the People" and not nine old Justices. 165 Thus, even as-
suming arguendo that Ackerman is right in characterizing his implicit
New Deal amendment as emanating from "We the People," the appli-
cation of that implicit amendment is inevitably left to nine Justices who
have nothing in writing to guide them. If this is not an invitation to
Lochnerian behavior, what is?
Moreover, Ackerman's proffered explanation of Brown and Gris-
wold is inherently circular because he requires the reader to first accept
that New Deal Court's "switch in time" was, in fact, tantamount to an
implicit constitutional amendment, not just a series of ordinary, run-of-
the-mill judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause. Only then
can one accept his own particular explanation of Brown and Griswold
as mere logical interpretations of the implicitly amended Constitution.
But if one does not accept his thesis that the New Deal Court decisions
constituted an implicit amendment, one must resort to a more chal-
lenging search of the written constitutional text for legitimation-a
search that the Warren Court took quite seriously. If one does not like
the Warren Court's proffered textual bases for Brown and Griswold,
one may, of course, characterize the decisions as "illegitimate." One
gets the sense, however, that Ackerman intensely wants to avoid this
characterization. He intimates that he does not like the Warren Court's
proffered textual bases for these decisions, thereby forcing him to seek
a non-textual (i.e., implicit) means of legitimating them:
The prophetic vision of the Court [in Brown and Griswold] is flatly
inconsistent with the principles of dualist democracy. Even if judges
165. Ackerman tries to distinguish his theory of dualism from "Burkeanism," which
Ackerman describes as the favored theory of practicing lawyers which pragmatically fo-
cuses on the notion of incrementally evolving precedents to explain constitutional change.
FouNDATIONs, supra note 4, at 17. Burkeans, according to Ackerman, do not think that
"We the People" should run the constitutional sh6w:
The People rule best, the Burkean says with a broad wink, when they leave the
business of government to a well-trained elite immersed in the nation's concrete
constitutional tradition. Slowly but surely, this elite will sense the drift of popular
sentiment and take the countless small steps needed to keep the tradition respon-
sive to the present's half-articulate sense of its special needs.
Id. at 20. While Ackerman acknowledges that this gradual, incremental change occurs, he
contends that Burkeans fail to see that popular uprising of the masses can also result in con-
stitutional change that is not gradual, but quite sudden. Id. at 20-21.
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could successfully gain popular acquiescence, this kind of top-down
transformation is the opposite of the bottom-up transformations
prized by dualist democrats. It is not the special province of the
judges to lead the People onward and upward to new and higher val-
ues.... Of course, it sometimes happens that a preservationist Court
may help spark a new forward-looking movement. This is my view
of Brown. Nonetheless, on those happy occasions when a Court
manages to provide constitutional symbols that new movements find
inspiring, it would be a tragic irony if this success should allow law-
yers to forget a crucial dualist truth: although judges are in a unique
position to preserve the past constitutional achievements of the
American people, many other citizens are in better positions to lead
the People onward to a better constitutional future. Before one ac-
cepts a prophetic reading of Brown or Griswold, it is only prudent to
consider the interpretive alternative. 166
Thus, by labeling the New Deal Court's "switch in time" as an im-
plicit constitutional amendment, Ackerman provides an intellectual
means to justify the Warren Court's noble ends. While Ackerman's
implicit amendment theory may provide some psychological solace to
legal academics similarly torn, it does not provide a principled basis for
ignoring Article V. If one does think the textual bases of Brown or
Griswold are invalid, one may take one's case to the American people
and seek to overturn the decisions or provide an explicit textual basis
for them via the procedures provided by Article V.
Assuming arguendo that Professor Ackerman is correct in his
characterization of the New Deal Court's switch as a constitutional
amendment rather than merely an altered interpretation, what are we to
make of his thesis? His primary thesis seems to be that Article V, the
textual proxy for the voice of "We the People," is broken. It is broken
because it has not been able to respond to the rational, mobilized politi-
cal will of "We the People"--creating a false negative-thereby leav-
ing unfulfilled certain popularly desired constitutional changes-
namely, the expansion of the commerce power. Because Article V has
not been able to respond to the collective political will of the people,
Ackerman asserts that Americans have consciously rejected Article V
as the exclusive means of constitutional alteration and have, in accor-
dance with the Founders' vision, resorted to other, implicit procedures
for bringing about the desired changes. 167 Whether Article V's proce-
166. Id. at 13940.
167. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 34-57 (describing and debunking the so-called
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dures do in fact present an insuperable barrier to the expression of the
political will of the American people will be explored extensively be-
low.
C. Professor Ackerman's Explicit Amendment to Article V
Perhaps revealing that an implicit amendment process may leave
something to be desired, Professor Ackerman proposes the following
explicit revision to the text of Article V:
During his or her second term in office, a President may propose
constitutional amendments to the Congress of the United States; if
two-thirds of both Houses approve a proposal, it shall be listed on
the ballot at the next two succeeding Presidential elections in each of
the several states; if three-fifths of the voters participating in each of
these elections should approve a proposed amendment, it shall be
ratified in the name of the People of the United States.
168
As an initial matter, it seems ironic that Professor Ackerman-the
most strident and articulate voice for the proposition that implicit con-
stitutional amendments exist-would propose an explicit textual
amendment to Article V. If implicit constitutional amendments exist,
why is an explicit textual amendment necessary? More importantly, if
such an explicit textual amendment to Article V is enacted, how should
it be enacted? Must it be enacted via the existing procedures in Article
V or could it also be enacted via an implicit amendment process? If
Professor Ackerman would opt for the former (explicit amendment via
the current Article V) rather than the latter (implicit amendment via his
four-step schema), does this suggest that, at least in this particular in-
stance, an implicit constitutional amendment is normatively undesir-
able?
169
If, on the other hand, Professor Ackerman would accept the
"ratification" of his proposed amendment via an implicit amendment
process, why does he need to provide us with the text of such amend-
ment? After all, if such an amendment were to be "ratified" via his im-
"Bicentennial Myth" of an exclusive Article V method of constitutional amendment).
168. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 54-55.
169. If Professor Ackerman would agree that his explicit textual amendment should be
enacted via the current Article V procedures (rather than his 4-step implicit amendment
process), this would bolster the impression that his implicit amendment process is intended
to be reserved only for moments of "grave crisis" in which expediency necessitates resort to
less cumbersome procedures in the present Article V. There is, after all, apparently no
"grave crisis" which would necessitate casting aside Article V in order to enact Professor
Ackerman's proffered explicit textual amendment.
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plicit amendment process, it would, by definition, not have any textual
basis, but would instead have to be gleaned from Supreme Court prece-
dents implementing the desires of a higher lawmaking movement, as
with the New Deal Court's implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment. The
mere fact that Professor Ackerman proffers a text at all should tell us
something. It should tell us that, when it comes to important constitu-
tional alteration, even Professor Ackerman seems to concede that hav-
ing a text to which one can refer is normatively desirable.
Assuming arguendo that Professor Ackerman's proffered explicit
textual amendment were enacted (whether by Article V or implicit
means), another unanswered question is whether, post-enactment, im-
plicit constitutional amendments could still be enacted. In other words,
is his proffered explicit amendment designed to set forth an exclusive
procedure for amending the Constitution? Assuming his proposal was
ratified, would future generations of Americans enter the higher law-
making track only to be relegated to the procedures set forth in his ex-
plicit alternative? If so, could the political desires of "We the People"
be thwarted? Are, in short, his explicit alternative procedures for con-
stitutional amendment so superior to those of the current Article V that
"We the People" would no longer need to resort to implicit amend-
ments?
In order to answer these questions, we must ask ourselves what it
is that his "new and improved" version of Article V offers us that the
current version does not. Does it offer us greater ability to respond to
national political crises? Probably not. Ackerman's "improved" pro-
cedure for constitutional amendment would require a minimum of eight
years (two succeeding Presidential elections)-and possibly much
longer-to obtain a desired constitutional alteration. 170  Compared to
the time frame required for ratification under Article V, this is as-
tounding. If one disregards the extreme case of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment,'7 ' which took 203 years to ratify,172 the time period for
170. Suppose, for example, that President Clinton had proposed a constitutional
amendment shortly after taking office in January 1996. Assuming that Congress expedi-
tiously approved his proposal by the requisite two-thirds vote, the proposal would have to
appear on the Presidential ballots in both 2000 and 2004 and receive three-fifths of the
popular vote in order to be ratified. Even in this relatively rosy scenario, the total elapsed
time is eight years. If, on the other hand, Congress could not muster the necessary two-
thirds in support of President Clinton's proposal until 2001, the amendment could not be
ratified until after the Presidential election of 2008-a total elapsed time from proposal to
ratification of over twelve years.
171. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment reads: "No law, varying the compensation for
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ratification under Article V ranges from a low of three and one-half
months (the Twenty-Sixth Amendment) to a high of three years and
seven months (the Twenty-Second Amendment), 173 yielding a median
time of twenty-three months-less than two years-for ratification.
Thus, to the extent that Ackerman seeks to speed up constitutional
change in order to respond to a perceived crisis, his proposed alterna-
tive clearly fails.
Ackerman must, therefore, be concerned about something more
than mere expediency. But what else does his proposed revision offer
us that the current Article V does not? Two things: (1) it permits the
President rather than Congress to propose constitutional amendments
and (2) it permits a three-fifths (sixty percent) supermajority of voters
in two succeeding Presidential elections to ratify the proposed amend-
ment, as opposed to the current requirement that three-fourths (seventy-
the services of Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election for Repre-
sentatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. The Twenty-Seventh
Amendment was one of the original twelve amendments proposed by Congress (ten of
which became the Bill of Rights) in 1789. Finis J. Garrett, Amending the Federal Constitu-
tion, 7 TENN. L. REV. 286, 300 (1929). The 38th state (Michigan) ratified it in May 1992.
Levinson, Introduction, supra note 138, at 5-6.
172. Indeed, one wonders if the Twenty-Seventh Amendment would be held invalid if
challenged on the grounds that the length of time required for ratification rendered the pro-
posal stale. In Dillon v. Gloss, for example, the Court suggested that a significant temporal
delay in ratification could render a proposed amendment invalid, specifically referring to
the proposal which became the Twenty-Seventh Amendment some 72 years later:
These considerations and the general purport and spirit of the [Fifth] Article lead
to the conclusion expressed by Judge Jameson "that an alteration of the Constitu-
tion proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and
that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second
time proposed by Congress." That this is the better conclusion becomes even
more manifest when what is comprehended in the other view is considered; for,
according to it, four amendments proposed long ago-two in 1789 [one of which
became the Twenty-Seventh Amendment], one in 1810 and one in 1861-are still
pending and in a situation where their ratification in some of the States many
years since by representatives generations now largely forgotten may be effec-
tively supplemented in enough more States to make three-fourths by representa-
tives of the present or some future generation. To that view few would be able to
subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite untenable. We conclude that the fair in-
ference or implication from Article V is that the ratification must be within some
reasonable time after the proposal.
256 U.S. at 375.
173. JoHN R. VILE, CONSTTrIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNrrED STATES 89-90 (1994).
The Twenty-Second Amendment, ratified in 1951, limited the number of presidential terms
to two. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXII. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, ex-
tended the franchise to individuals age 18 or older. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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five percent) of state legislatures (or conventions) must ratify. What
does this mean? Besides the shift from Congress to the President in the
proposal power, 174 the most striking features of Professor Ackerman's
alternative are: (1) it alters the necessary ratification supermajority from
seventy-five percent of state legislatures (or conventions) to sixty per-
cent of Presidential election voters and (2) it deletes any direct role for
the states qua states in the constitutional amendment process, bypassing
federalism altogether. 75 Professor Ackerman's explicit alternative thus
alters the two salient values in the current Article V: supermajoritarian-
ism and federalism.
D. Supermajoritarianism in the Constitutional Amendment Process
Professor Ackerman attempts to retain a form of supermajoritari-
anism in his alternative version of Article V. But it is clearly a nation-
alistic version, not the federalist version of the original Article V. Pre-
cisely why Ackerman believes a supermajority of sixty percent of
voters in a Presidential election is preferable to seventy-five percent of
state legislatures is unclear. Perhaps Ackerman distrusts state-level
politics or simply prefers national politics. Perhaps he simply believes
it would be administratively simpler to take a national headcount than a
state by state headcount. Whatever the case, Ackerman's explicit alter-
native to Article V concedes the value of supermajoritarianism, albeit in
an altered, purely nationalistic form.
His theory of implicit constitutional amendment, by contrast, does
not appear to incorporate supermajoritarianism at all. He never tells us
whether, for example, the New Deal "switch in time" would be, in his
mind, illegitimate absent a supermajority. Indeed, all he tells us is that,
to be legitimate, an implicit constitutional amendment must have the
174. Precisely why Professor Ackerman prefers the Chief Executive as the source of
proposal is enigmatic. Perhaps he believes the President to be more politically in tune with
or responsive to the American people and would therefore be more willing than Congress to
propose constitutional amendments when desired by the people. But such rationale has
neither empirical nor instinctive support, especially when one considers that members of the
House of Representatives must run for re-election every two years, whereas the President is
held politically accountable to the people only once every four years. Moreover, certainly a
second-term, "lame duck" President is less likely than Congress to be responsive to the
people, since he does not have to face re-election, whereas members of Congress must face
the electorate again if they wish to keep their jobs.
175. While Professor Ackerman's explicit amendment does require two-thirds ap-
proval by Congress, this is a far cry from the direct involvement of the states qua states in
both proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments that is currently provided in
Article V. For a more detailed discussion of this important distinction, see infra Part III. E.
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backing of a mobilized citizenry and that the mobilized citizenry must
have given a "decisive" electoral victory to advocates of the desired
constitutional change. 176 But just because the advocates of a desired
constitutional change succeed in obtaining a "decisive" electoral vic-
tory for their preferred candidate, it does not follow that a supermajority
of Americans voted in favor of this candidate because of the candi-
date's views on the single issue of constitutional change. Thus, for ex-
ample, if candidate X runs for President on a platform of support for is-
sues A, B, C & D-issue C being the issue of constitutional change-it
does not logically follow that every voter who casts a vote for candidate
X necessarily supports his position on issue C. Indeed, when there are
multiple issues at stake in an election (which there invariably are), then
one cannot say, without engaging in pure speculation, whether or not
any one particular issue was a motivating factor in any given voter's
decision.
177
Take, for example, the 1936 Presidential election, which Professor
Ackerman claims was the decisive electoral victory for FDR in which
"We the People" voiced our overwhelming support for an implicit con-
stitutional amendment to expand the Commerce Clause.17 8 In the 1936
election, FDR ran on a platform of numerous issues, including, most
prominently, opposing the growth of fascism abroad, but also such
things as enacting Social Security, revitalizing farms, and reducing
slum housing and unemployment through government aid. 179 The
176. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 48-49; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 76.
177. I concede that if one obtains extensive polling data, one might well be able to say,
with some degree of confidence, that issue C was or was not a motivating factor in an indi-
vidual voter's decision. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Professor Ackerman does
not offer any empirical evidence to support a conclusion that a supermajority of the voters
in the 1936 presidential election supported FDR due to a belief that the Commerce Clause
needed to be implicitly amended. Indeed, it is quite an intellectual leap to say that support
for FDR- and even for his economic vision-implies tacit voter support for the idea that
the commerce power ought to be broadened beyond its textual boundaries in Article I, Sec-
tion 8, without the necessity of resorting to the explicit procedures provided in Article V for
constitutional amendment. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see discussion infra
Part III. D.
178. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 48; see also id. at 53 ("If the American people
were ever endorsing a break with their constitutional past, they were doing so in the
1930s.").
179. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency,
Philadelphia, Pa., June 27, 1936, reprinted in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 230-36 (Random House 1938) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Accep-
tance]; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to the Congress, Jan. 3, 1936, reprinted in 5
THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 8-18 (Random House 1938);
see also BASIL RAUCH, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933-38, 225-232 (Capricorn
[Vol. 48:139
1998] Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause 181
Democratic Party also, of course, continued its call for national labor
standards, which the Supreme Court in Schechter had held were uncon-
stitutional as beyond the commerce power. 80
While public support for national labor standards was broad, this
does not mean that FDR's "decisive" victory in 1936 was a reflection
of supermajoritarian support for an implicit constitutional amendment
to implement them. Notably, FDR's June 1936 speech accepting the
Democratic Party's nomination did not mention the Supreme Court de-
cisions invalidating portions of the New Deal or the possibility of any
action to reverse those decisions.,8 And the infamous "Court Packing
Plan" was not publicly announced until several months after the 1936
election, making it impossible for voters in that election to send an im-
plicit message about the propriety of alternative means of achieving the
desired ends.8 2 Indeed, the Democratic Party's 1936 platform pro-
claimed that if the problems of the country "cannot be effectively
solved by legislation within the Constitution, we shall seek such clari-
fying amendment as will assure to the legislatures of the several States
and the Congress of the United States, each within its proper jurisdic-
tion, the power to enact those laws... .,,"3 The Democratic Party's
platform position in 1936 was thus a position in support of an explicit
constitutional amendment, enacted via Article V procedures, to grant
Congress and the states the necessary power to enact the reforms that
the Court had been invalidating.184
Thus, even assuming arguendo that one could conclude that a vote
for FDR in 1936 reflected support for the single issue of reversing the
Court's decisions invalidating New Deal legislation, it is more reason-
able to conclude that FDR supporters backed the Democratic Party's
position to enact an explicit constitutional amendment via Article V
rather than an inchoate, unwritten implicit amendment which was never
publicly voiced by their candidate or their party. In short, there is no
Books 1963).
180. 295 U.S. 495 (invalidating portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act on
Commerce Clause and nondelegation grounds); see supra Part II.
181. Roosevelt, Acceptance, supra note 179, reprinted in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS &
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 230-36 (Random House 1938).
182. RAUCH, supra note 179, at 233.
183. Wallace S. Sayre, Major Party Platforms of 1936, CURRENT HIST., Aug. 1936, at
52 (emphasis added).
184. See They Yielded Democracy, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1937, at B8 (editorial noting
that Democratic Party platform in 1936 also contained a pledge to "maintain the letter and
spirit of the Constitution").
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indication that "We the People," by re-electing FDR by a large margin
in 1936, were voicing our support for an implicit constitutional
amendment, much less an amendment so broad as to effectively grant
Congress a police power. Stated another way, one cannot conclude that
an individual who voted for FDR in 1936 would have also supported his
new position, favoring a more expedient means to achieve the desired
ends.
The unease some FDR supporters felt with their President's at-
tempt to subvert Article V was echoed in several editorials contempo-
raneous with FDR's announcement of the Court Packing Plan, many of
them by newspapers which had endorsed FDR in the 1936 election."5
For example, a Washington Post editorial from February 7, 1937-two
days after the Plan was announced--emphatically proclaimed that it
was an extreme departure from the theme of FDR's 1936 re-election
campaign and a complete surprise to his supporters:
[I]n his campaign for re-election, Mr. Roosevelt repeatedly asserted
that he had no revolutionary designs on the fundamental institutions
of American Government. There was never the slightest hint to the
voters that, if returned to the office of Chief Executive, he would
promptly advocate packing the Supreme Court. The magnitude of
the shock afforded by his message of Friday is the measure of the
complete unpreparedness of the Nation for this proposal.
Even when Mr. Roosevelt's campaign speeches are carefully
re-read they will be found to give no intimation of the fundamental
change he now advocates. In the address at Madison Square Garden,
on the eve of election, the President did announce that the only pass
key to the White House would remain in his pocket. But he never
suggested that he intended to put the pass key to the Supreme Court
on the same ring.
Similarly, in his acceptance speech at Philadelphia, "dedicated
to the simple and sincere expression of an attitude toward problems,"
he vehemently denied designs on the American system of Govern-
ment, asserting on the contrary that "we are fighting to save a great
and precious form of Government for ourselves and for the world."
... There is the further fact that Mr. Roosevelt never once
asked and certainly never received a popular mandate for the course
he now proposes. On the contrary, he effectively lulled to sleep any
185. For a sampling of editorials from newspapers around the country, see Most Com-
ment is Unfavorable to Court Plan, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 1937, at A2.
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anticipation of this course which might have existed before the elec-
tion. 1
8 6
Likewise, the New York Times editorialized that FDR's plan
leaves him fairly open to the charge that he is endeavoring to do by
indirection what he cannot do directly [i.e., by explicit constitutional
amendment].... Nor will the fact fail to be emphasized that Mr.
Roosevelt gave not a single hint of such a scheme in any of his
speeches during the campaign. If he was then meditating it, when
seeking a mandate from the people, it would have been only proper
for him to make public some hint of his intention.187
The Baltimore Sun was even more direct, angrily stating:
The President is fresh from a national election in which he was re-
peatedly challenged to declare whether he had plans either to amend
the Constitution or to alter the Supreme Court. He avoided the issue
when the voters were going to the polls. To put it conservatively,
Mr. Roosevelt has been disingenuous with the people.
188
The Cleveland Plain Dealer argued that "[s]o momentous a pro-
gram [as the New Deal] calls for the wider consideration, the more
mature deliberation of the amending process" and noted that the
"present Congress has no instructions from home to pass [the Court
Packing] legislation."189  The St. Paul Pioneer Press concluded that
"the democratic way of proceeding is to empower the Federal Govern-
ment with new authority in the way it has always been done in the past,
and the way provided in the Constitution itself-by amendment."'"
The Kansas City Star agreed, concluding that "[i]f this nation is to
lodge in the Federal Government absolute powers over industry and
commerce, that question should be decided by the people themselves.
186. They Yielded Democracy, supra note 184, at B8 (emphasis added); see also
Revolutionary & Subversive, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1937, at A8 ("The effect, if not the
purpose, of such [Court Packing] procedure would be irrevocably to shatter the balance
between Federal & State powers which the Supreme Court was established to maintain, and
which it can not possibly maintain under determined political pressure. The procedure
would at least tend to make the Constitution a dead letter. And while it would undoubtedly
bring this country much closer to a state of pure democracy than is the case today, the pro-
cedure evidently implies a tremendous enlargement of that executive power which the
founding fathers were determined to keep within limited bounds.").
187. Remaking the Judiciary, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1937, at C16 (emphasis added).
188. Opinions of the Nation's Press on Court Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1937, at A10;
Most Comment Unfavorable to Court Plan, supra note 185, at A2.
189. Opinions of the Nation's Press on Court Plan, supra note 188, at A10.
190. Id.
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A constitutional amendment should determine it, not the short cut of an
increase in the size of the court... .,191 The Richmond Times-Dispatch
concluded that "[w]e have supported Mr. Roosevelt heretofore in many
of his purposes and objectives, but we certainly cannot go along with
him on his latest [Court Packing] proposal. 192 Franklyn Waltman, a
popular syndicated columnist, opined that
[m]any persons who applaud President Roosevelt's general objec-
tives do not believe that such an expansion of Federal control should
take place without specifically submitting the question to the people
of this country, but under the President's [Court Packing] plan the
prospects all point to changing thusly the basic foundations of the
Constitution without any reference to the people.
Several letters to the editors of the Washington Post also hint that
such opposition was shared by individual voters who had supported
FDR in 1936, but who parted company with their President on the
means he had chosen to achieve the desired ends.194 For example, one
anonymous writer, a self-labeled "federal employee," wrote to the
Washington Post:
I have been an ardent supporter of Mr. Roosevelt and his policies
since 1932, because I have believed that his whole purpose has been
to act as the instrument of the people's wishes .... But with his re-
cent Supreme Court proposal, I believe that Mr. Roosevelt is about
to usurp the most fundamental of rights guaranteed to the people by
the Constitution-that of the right of constitutional amendment.
And I must say that I cannot go along with him on this, no matter
how honest his intentions may be.
It is not expressed, nor can it be implied, that the makers of the
Constitution ever intended that the remedy against void legislation
should be placed in the hands of the Chief Executive. Yet that is
actually what Mr. Roosevelt is asking for. It is the people's right and
their's [sic] alone. Else why did the makers specifically provide for
amendment by the people directly? For Congress to give the Presi-
dent this power to pack the Supreme Court for his obvious purpose,
191. Id
192. Most Comment Unfavorable to Court Plan, supra, note 185, at A2.
193. Franklyn Waltman, Politics & People: President's Frankness in Latest Fireside
Chat Effective Indictment of Court Minority, WASH. PosT, Mar. 11, 1937, at A2 (emphasis
added).
194. The Proposed Judicial Reform, WASH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1937, at A8.
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is to create a dangerous precedent which may easily culminate with
the people never being given the chance again to amend their Con-
stitution. That would be the destruction of a fundamental right of the
people and a severe blow to our democratic form of government.
So it would appear that Mr. Roosevelt has misconstrued the
popular mandate he received in the 1936 election, for I am sure the
American people never intended to surrender their constitutional
right of amendment when they so heartily endorsed his program.
195
Another FDR supporter wrote:
I have been a Democrat all my life, an original Roosevelt man, and
one of his most loyal supporters. But when he comes forward with a
proposition to pack the Supreme Court with "yes men," Mr. Roose-
velt and I are parting company, which I think will be the attitude of
plenty of Democrats like myself.
If Mr. Roosevelt has had this intention all along why didn't he
tell the voters before the November election? If he thinks the people
of the United States gave him a supreme mandate on matters like
this, let him submit the proposition to the people by amending the
Constitution with existing procedure.
196
Numerous New Dealers-Democrats as well as liberal Republi-
cans-also opposed FDR's plan, generally on the grounds that it would
effectively alter the constitutional balance of power between the na-
tional government and the states without taking the issue directly to the
people. 97 Opposition to the plan by women and those living in the
farm belt was particularly strong, leaving numerous Democratic Con-
gressmen and Senators lukewarm to the plan and fueling speculation
that FDR would tour the country in order to drum up support amongst
these groups. 19 Given the growing opposition among their constitu-
ents, many Democrats began voicing outright opposition to their Presi-
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id. (letter signed by George W. Rossiter) (emphasis added).
197. See, e.g., Robert C. Albright, Johnson Leads Senate Revolt Against Roosevelt
Proposal as Court Hears Labor Appeal, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1937, at Al; Arthur Krock,
Roosevelt Asks Reform of Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1937, at A8 (noting that conservative
Democrats "gagged at the proposals affecting the Supreme Court."); Franklyn Waltman,
Politics & People: Odds Against Roosevelt Getting Supreme Court Program; Is Opposed in
Own Party, WASH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1937, at A2 [hereinafter Waltman, Politics & People].
198. Turner Catledge, Roosevelt Plans a Court Bill Tour, Washington Hears, N.Y.
TwEs, Feb. 27, 1937, at Al.
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dent's plan.' 99 For example, Senator Frederick Van Nuys, a Democrat
from Indiana and an historic FDR defender, opposed the Court Packing
Plan, stating that he would "not be a party to breaking [the constitu-
tional checks and balances] down in the absence of a mandate from the
people to that effect-which means the submission and ratification of a
constitutional amendment. ',200 Likewise, liberal Senator Wheeler of
Montana, a Democratic Party Vice Presidential candidate in 1924, vo-
cally opposed the Plan as establishing a "dangerous precedent" and
urged the passage of an explicit constitutional amendment instead.2"'
Democratic Senator Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia opposed the Plan on
grounds that it subverted the "orderly means" of constitutional amend-
ment provided by Article V.202 Democratic Senator Josiah Bailey of
North Carolina, in a radio address to his constituents, opposed the Court
Packing Plan on grounds that it "predicates a new version of the Con-
stitution" and was as morally corrupt as stacking a jury in the middle of
a trial.20 3 Several high profile New Dealers and FDR confidants, in-
cluding Raymond Moley, Morris Ernst and Frank Walsh, also publicly
opposed the Plan. °4
Absent mind-reading abilities or extensive contemporaneous poll-
ing data, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about how
FDR supporters felt concerning their President's decision to use extra-
Article V means to effectuate the New Deal. But the historical docu-
ments available do suggest that, for at least some New Dealers, FDR's
scheme to get around Article V was viewed with hostility and disbe-
lief.205 Such a negative reaction is not particularly surprising since FDR
did not, prior to the 1936 election, put the American people on notice of
his intent to circumvent Article V if the Supreme Court continued along
its path of invalidation. Press accounts of the announcement of the
199. See infra notes 200-203 and accompanying text; see also Robert C. Albright,
Cummings Denies Roosevelt Seeks 'Subservient' Court; Urges Change, WASH. POST, Mar.
11, 1937 (noting that Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, a Democrat "hitherto believed to be
leaning heavily toward the President's viewpoint," surprised the media by proposing an ex-
plicit constitutional amendment to require that acts of Congress could be invalidated by the
Supreme Court only by a two-thirds vote).
200. Albright, supra note 197, at A2.
201. "Bad Precedent," Senator Asserts; Asks Amendment, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 14,
1937, at Al.
202. Krock, supra note 197, at A8.
203. Roosevelt's Plans to Revamp Court Attacked by Bailey, ATLANTA CONST., Feb.
14, 1937, atA2.
204. Franklyn Waltman, Politics & People, supra note 197, at A2.
205. See sources cited supra note 197.
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Court Packing Plan indicate that FDR intentionally kept the Plan secret
in order to maximize its impact,20 6 and that it hit "like a bombshell,
' 20 7
which "produced a sensation almost beyond comparison"20 8 and "took
the country by surprise. 20 9 Thus, it simply cannot be said that "We the
People," by re-electing FDR in 1936, had formed any opinion on the
acceptability of employing extra-Article V means to implement the
New Deal.
Professor Ackerman's contention that the New Deal Court's
switch was a democratic decision deeply rooted in democracy 210 is thus
contrary to the historical facts. The only possible basis for his conten-
tion is that "We the People" consciously employed non-Article V
means in order to bring about the desired ends (i.e., successful imple-
mentation of New Deal legislation) because we agreed with FDR that
Article V would produce too little, too late.211 But, again, there is no
evidence of broad-based popular support to discard Article V in favor
of more "expedient" means of constitutional amendment. Indeed, in the
twenty years or so immediately preceding the New Deal Court's switch,
there were literally dozens of joint resolutions introduced in Congress
which sought to amend Article V, the majority of which sought to ex-
pedite the amendment process by increasing popular involvement in
either the proposal212 or the ratification 213 stages. These resolutions,
206. See, e.g., President Succeeded in Keeping His Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1937,
at A9; Roosevelt Kept Plan on High Court Secret, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1937, at 7A.
207. Turner Catledge, Roosevelt Asks Power to Reform Courts, Increasing Supreme
Court Bench to 15 Justices; Congress Startled, But Expected to Approve-Bill is Intro-
duced, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 6, 1937, at Al.
208. Power Requested to Add Justices to Supreme Court, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 6,
1937, at Al.
209. Franklyn Waltman, Roosevelt Asks 6 New High Court Justices, WASH. POST, Feb.
6, 1937, at Al.
210. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 113-14.
211. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 44 ("Rather than meekly following the marching
orders of the Federalists, both [Reconstruction] Republicans and [New Deal] Democrats
were constitutionally creative procedurally no less than substantively-and they knew it.").
212. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 110, 67th Cong., 1st Sess (1921) (petition by 500,000 voters
during congressional elections or I million voters during a special election may propose
constitutional amendments); H.R.J. Res. 123, 66th Cong., 1st Sess (1919) (same); H.R.J.
Res. 60, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. (1919) (same); S.J. Res. 22, 66th Cong, Ist Sess. (1919)
(same); H.R.J. Res. 294, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) (majority of voters in 213 of states
may propose amendments); H.R.J. Res. 319, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) (10% of voters in a
majority of states may propose amendments); S.J. Res. 26, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913)
(permitting 15% of voters in 24 states to propose constitutional amendments); S.J. Res. 24,
63d Cong., 1st Sess (1913) (permitting a majority of both houses of Congress or voters in
10 states to propose constitutional amendments); see also Ernest C. Carman, Why & How
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however, were universally rejected.214 It therefore seems reasonable to
conclude that the New Deal generation carefully considered the proce-
dures contained in Article V, openly debated them,25 and ultimately
found them adequate to meet the exigencies of modem America. Even
more persuasive, however, is the extensive historical evidence which
indicates that immediately after the Court's June 1935 Schechter Poul-
try decision invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act-the
cornerstone legislation of the New Deal216-Congress began serious and
widely publicized deliberations on various proposed explicit constitu-
tional amendments which would have expanded national power in order
to implement New Deal legislation. Senator Edward Costigan, for
the Present Method ofAmending the Federal Constitution Should be Changed, 17 ORE. L.
REV. 102, 108 (1938) (proposing specific text of amendment to Article V which would
permit a majority of state legislatures to propose amendments and a majority of voters dur-
ing the next national election to ratify such proposed amendments).
213. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 429, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923) (stating that "any state
may require that ratification by its legislature be subject to confirmation by popular vote");
S.J. Res. 4, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923) (same); S.J. Res. 40, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921)
(same); H.R.J. Res. 69, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) (same); H.R.J. Res. 60, 66th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1919) (same); S.J. Res 22, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) (permitting ratification by a
majority of voters in a popular referendum); S.J. Res. 24, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913)
(allowing ratification by a majority of voters in a majority of states). In 1924, the Senate
Judiciary Committee favorably reported out a resolution which would have permitted con-
stitutional amendments to be ratified directly by popular vote. See generally S. REP. No.
202, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). However, this resolution never reached the Senate floor.
214. See supra notes 212-213. Post New Deal efforts by various states which have
petitioned Congress for an explicit amendment to Article V to increase state power over the
proposal of constitutional amendments have also failed. See 103 CONG. REc. 4831 (1957)
(petition by Idaho to permit a 2/3 vote of 12 state legislatures to propose constitutional
amendments); 102 CONG. REC. 7241 (1956) (same petition by Michigan); 101 CONG. REC.
2861 (1955) (same petition by South Dakota).
215. See generally, Carman, supra note 212; Garrett, supra note 171; Robert von
Moschzisker, Dangers in Disregarding Fundamental Conceptions When Amending the
Federal Constitution, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1925); Amending the Constitution, 24 A.B.A. J.
298 (1938).
216. See supra Part II.
217. See Robert C. Albright, Special Session Still Rumored on Capitol Hill, WASH.
POST, June 2, 1935, at Al7 (stating that "at least one new proposal for a constitutional
amendment was advanced in the Senate, and a group of House independents called a non-
partisan conference for Tuesday morning to consider ways and means of amending the
Constitution to meet the President's social and economic legislative demands"); Senators
See Upheaval Over Roosevelt Plan, CHL TRm., June 2, 1935, at A5 ("[A] public reaction on
expanding the powers of the central government to invade the states and deal with all social
and economic problems would be sought with a view of calling a special session of con-
gress in the fall. The congress would be asked to pass a resolution to amend the constitu-
tion, the senate leaders say, and the states would be asked to call their legislatures in special
session to ratify it."); Franklyn Waltman, Jr., Suits on NRA are Dropped by Roosevelt,
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example, introduced a joint resolution to amend the Constitution which
would have granted Congress the "power to regulate hours and condi-
tions of labor and to establish minimum wages in any employment and
to regulate production, industry, business, trade and commerce to pre-
vent unfair methods and practices therein. '218 Senator William E. Bo-
rah also supported an explicit constitutional amendment, forcefully ad-
vocating that the issue of constitutional change be brought directly to
the people. 9 In a radio address defending the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Schechter Poultry, Senator Borah stated:
The only thing I shall urge is that in the matter of the change
the people be consulted. The Constitution should not be changed by
the Supreme Court. It should not be changed in Washington. It
should be changed by the people alone.
Nothing should blind us to the fact, no emergency should con-
fuse us to the great truth that the rights of the States are peculiarly
the rights of the people and touch their habits and customs and daily
way of living as nothing else may.... If any change is contemplated
in this respect the first to be consulted should be the people them-
selves and that can only be brought about through an open proposal
for an amendment to the Constitution. The people know what, if
any, portion of their local rights they are safe in surrendering far
better.., than the courts or the Congress or the executive depart-
ments can possibly know.
... Those who feel, therefore, that the States should be shorn of
their power in whole or in part owe it to the people to submit their
proposals to the people in the way of a definite amendment. That is
the American way to meet this issue.
220
WASH. POST, June 2, 1935, at Al, A9 ("On Capitol Hill, as Democrats and Republicans
alike sought to divine the consequences of the momentous events of this week, a group of
House liberals prepared to meet Tuesday to lay plans for amendment of the Constitution to
bring it into line with New Deal ideas. Representative Maury Maverick (Democrat) of
Texas, in a radio address, proposed amending the Constitution.").
218. See, e.g., Blue Eagle Saw Many Dark Days Before This Last Crisis, WASH. POST,
June 2, 1935, at B4; see also Felix Bruner, Borah Dares New Deal to Test Constitution;
Labor to Aid Roosevelt, WASH. POST, June 3, 1935, at Al, A4.
219. See Bruner, supra note 218, at Al; Senator Borah on Democracy, WASH. POST,
June 4, 1935, at A8.
220. The Text of Senator Borah's Address Defending the NRA Decision, WASH. POST,
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The Washington Post editorialized that Senator Borah's appeals
for explicit constitutional amendment were based upon "unquestionable
wisdom," concluding that "[a] nation may choose between a govern-
ment operated at the discretion of its rulers, or operated under laws ap-
proved by and changeable only through the will of its people. The for-
mer is a dictatorship; the latter a democracy. 22'
If "We the People" so overwhelmingly supported an expanded
commerce power, as Professor Ackerman asserts, one must wonder
why FDR did not request congressional proposal of an explicit consti-
tutional amendment and, likewise, why the American people did not
demand such a proposal of their elected representatives.222 According
to leading newspaper accounts shortly after the announcement of the
Schechter Poultry decision, FDR clearly pondered going the route of
Article V:
The party leaders took it for granted, from the President's remarks at
yesterday's press conference, that he is planning a constitutional
amendment to get around the Supreme Court's decisions shattering
the foundations of the New Deal.
Everything the President said indicated the only solution was adop-
tion of a constitutional amendment giving the Federal Government
jurisdiction over wages, working conditions and production in min-
ing, manufacturing and farming.
There would seem to be no doubt that [Roosevelt] wants a constitu-
tional amendment of the interstate commerce clause on perhaps a
popular referendum on the subject, as some authorities contend is
permissible under the basic law... [T]he President is acting in the
American tradition when he heads a direct movement for legal
change instead of looking to the high court for a succession of what
June 3, 1935, at A4; cf William Edgar Borah, Two Historic Pronouncements on the Su-
preme Court; Borah, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 1937, at B4.
221. Senator Borah on Democracy, supra note 219, at A8.
222. Indeed, there have been four constitutional amendments enacted via the proce-
dures of Article V which have overturned Supreme Court decisions deemed undesirable by
"We the People." The four amendments are: (1) the 11 th Amendment, which overturned
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); (2) the 14th Amendment, which overturned Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); (3) the 16th Amendment, which overturned Pollack v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); and (4) the 26th Amendment, which
overturned Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 802 (1970). These four amendments suggest that,
when "We the People" so desire, we are fully capable of firing up the machinery of Article
V to effectuate the desired constitutional change.
223. Senators See Upheaval Over Roosevelt Plan, CH. TRIB., June 2, 1935, at A5.
224. Waltman, supra note 91, at Al.
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Alice Longworth, speaking of the gold-clause case, called
"pragmatic sanctions.' 225
Indeed, the New York Times reported that FDR and his key advi-
sors were considering asking Congress to propose an explicit amend-
ment specifying that the mode of ratification must be by state conven-
tions acting via popular referenda.226 In this manner, it was believed
that an explicit constitutional amendment implementing New Deal leg-
islation could be proposed by Congress and ratified by the requisite
three-fourths of states within only sixty days.227 But FDR ultimately
rejected the idea of an explicit constitutional amendment, believing it
would be vulnerable to judicial sabotage by hostile judges and that
there was insufficient time to resort to the cumbersome machinery of
Article V.228 Thus, despite extensive talk of an explicit constitutional
amendment, none was ever proposed by FDR or Congress, nor peti-
tioned by the states.
225. Dinwoodey, supra note 91, at E3.
226. Washington Studies Plan for a Quick Amendment of Federal Constitution, N.Y.
TIEs, June 2, 1935, at Al.
227. Id.
228. See RExaoRD G. TuGWELL, THE DEMOCRATic ROOSEVELT: A BIOGRAPHY OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 414-15 (1957). In his radio broadcast of March 9, 1937-
approximately 4 months after his re-election-FDR explained his abandonment of his
party's platform position in support of an explicit constitutional amendment as follows:
It would take months or years to get substantial agreement upon the type and
language of an amendment. It would take months and years thereafter to get a
two-thirds majority in favor of that amendment in both houses of the Congress.
Then would come the long course of ratification by three-fourths of the States.
No amendment which any powerful economic interests or the leaders of any pow-
erful political party have had reason to oppose has ever been ratified within any-
thing like a reasonable time. And thirteen States which contain only 5 percent of
the voting population can block ratification, even though the thirty-five States
with 95 percent of the population are in favor of it.
And remember one thing more. Even if an amendment were passed, and even
if in the years to come it were to be ratified, its meaning would depend upon the
kind ofjustices who would be sitting on the Supreme Court bench. And amend-
ment, like the rest of the Constitution, is what the justices say it is, rather than
what its framers or you might hope it is.
EPsTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7, at 300 (emphasis added); Text of President's 'Fireside
Chat' Defending Court Reorganization Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1937, at A15; Text of
President Roosevelt's Fireside Chat Urging Supreme Court Change, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
1937, at A6; see also Robert C. Albright, House Passes Retirement Bill; Vote on Second
Court Change Delayed by Roosevelt's Edict, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1937, at Al; FDR Maps
Strategy on Bar With Cabinet Gives No Sign of Yielding to Foes, Compromisers, ATLANTA
CONST., Feb. 13, 1937, at 2; Paul Mallon, News Behind the News, ATLANTA CONST., Feb.
13, 1937, at 6.
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FDR must have come to the ineluctable conclusion that an explicit
amendment was not politically possible, that he could not obtain the
requisite two-thirds approval of Congress nor three-quarters approval of
the states for such a fundamental alteration of the governmental struc-
ture. Indeed, congressional reaction to the idea of an explicit amend-
ment to broaden national power was quite negative.229 Why would it be
difficult to obtain the support of two-thirds of Congress and three-
quarters of the (then) forty-eight states for an explicit amendment to
implement the New Deal? Two possible answers emerge: (1) there was
insufficient supermajoritarian consensus as to the propriety or appropri-
ate scope of such an amendment; and (2) such an explicit amendment
would upset the delicate national-state balance of power, triggering rati-
fication resistance by the states.
The second point will be discussed extensively in the next section
on federalism. With regard to the first point-lack of supermajoritarian
consensus-it is enough to say that it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to obtain even simple majoritarian consensus on the breadth of an
explicit New Deal amendment. Should it grant to Congress a broad
power to enact any form of "social justice," as many union leaders ad-
vocated? 230  Or should it be a narrower grant of authority, allowing
Congress only to regulate industrial working conditions? Or perhaps
even narrower, permitting regulation of only certain industries, such as
manufacturing, mining and agriculture? Whether and to what extent to
grant Congress a new regulatory power was obviously a question sub-
ject to numerous opinions, making expeditious approval by two-thirds
of Congress and three-fourths of the states difficult.
2 31
229. See Albright, supra note 217, at A17 (stating that Senator Norris of Nebraska
"was decidedly pessimistic about the prospects of revising the Constitution.. ." and stating
that "[o]ther Senate Democrats declared the President would be unable to get a two-thirds
vote of the Senate to submit a constitutional amendment"); Capitol Split on Roosevelt's
NRA Comment, WASH. PoST, June 1, 1935, at Al (stating that "[a] broad cross-section of
Democrats joined with Republicans in condemning the constitutional amendment route as a
way out of NRA difficulties"); Senators See Upheaval Over Roosevelt Plan, CHI. TRIB.,
June 2, 1935, at A5 (quoting Senator Alfred Smith as saying, "[tlhey'll never amend the
constitution. They can't get two-thirds in each house of [C]ongress for such a scheme,
much less the ratification of three-fourths of the states."); Franklyn Waltman, Jr., President
Drops NRA; Retains Skeleton Stafffor Research in Trade, WASH. PoST, June 5, 1935, at Al
(reporting that Senator Borah of Idaho "indicated belief... that, if the President's ultimate
purpose is to seek expansion of Federal control in intrastate matters [via an explicit consti-
tutional amendment], he will not succeed").
230. See Committee Divided on Plan: Green Backs Court Change, N.Y. TIMnS, Feb. 7,
1937, at A33.
231. See FDR Maps Strategy On Bar With Cabinet, supra note 228, at 2.
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The American people wanted the national government to improve
their lives, to help pull them out of the depression. And they also sup-
ported their President, whose vision instilled in them a sense of hope
they so desperately needed. But despite their support for FDR, the
American people clearly did not heed his early calls for an explicit con-
stitutional amendment. They did not rally in the streets or petition
Congress to propose such an amendment. They may have realized that
the expansion of national power desired by FDR was potentially dan-
gerous, a greater danger to the long-term well-being of the country than
the waning economic depression. They may have been unable to agree
on the scope of the transfer of power to the national government.232 Or
they may have simply been too lazy to muster the political energy nec-
essary to sustain a movement for an explicit constitutional amendment.
If any of these suggestions is even partially true, one must seriously
ponder what long-term impact Professor Ackerman's implicit amend-
ment theory may have on democracy. Because the New Deal genera-
tion either did not approve of expanding national power or could not
agree on the scope of such expansion, amendment via Article V was
unlikely. Is this result normatively undesirable? If the New Deal gen-
eration was ambivalent about how to resolve this important constitu-
tional question, does this not suggest that, by failing to enact an explicit
amendment via Article V, our representational form of democracy was
working rather well?
Moreover, if, as Professor Ackerman suggests, implicit constitu-
tional amendments allow the Constitution to be more malleable in re-
sponse to popular political will, they may also encourage political leth-
argy in the long-run. Indeed, by making its "switch in time," the New
232. As syndicated columnist Franklyn Waltman put it in March, 1937:
The President's contention that there is no "substantial agreement" on the type
of an [explicit] amendment is a little mystifying, especially since he claims in the
same breath to have a mandate from the people to undertake certain unspecified
courses of action. If that mandate exists, if it is sufficient to give the President
power to name a Supreme Court in harmony with his political philosophy, then it
is sufficient, as soon as he assumes the leadership in that direction, to bring about
"substantial agreement" on a Constitutional amendment plainly authorizing what
he seeks.
His contention that "substantial agreement" on the type of an [explicit]
amendment necessary to meet his objectives is lacking, in reality is an argument
that there is a lack of approval for the broad course which Mr. Roosevelt would
like to follow. And the lack of "substantial agreement" on his Supreme Court
scheme is evidence of the truth of that contention.
Franklyn Waltman, Politics & People: President's Frankness in Latest Fireside Chat Ef-
fective Indictment of Court Minority, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1937, at A2.
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Deal Court made continued mass political mobilization unnecessary,
hence weakening, rather than strengthening, democracy. Stated another
way, the New Deal Court's switch effectively took the wind out of the
sails of those crying for explicit amendment, allowing the New Deal
generation to go on with their daily lives without having to mobilize
further to resolve arguably the most important constitutional question
raised since the Founding.
If Americans therefore accept Professor Ackerman's challenge to
come "out of the closet" and acknowledge legitimate implicit constitu-
tional amendments, they would effectively be relieved of the "burden"
of mobilizing to the extent required by Article V. And although Profes-
sor Ackerman's four-step schema requires a "decisive" electoral victory
for the party advocating constitutional change,233 this is a far cry from
the sort of political mobilization required to ratify an explicit amend-
ment via Article V. Under Professor Ackerman's implicit amendment
theory, "We the People" would have to provide a decisive victory for
the party advocating constitutional change, but after Election Day, we
would not have to get out of our recliners. After Election Day, we
would no longer have an incentive to write letters to our elected offi-
cials or march in the streets or attend political rallies because our de-
sires could be implemented through the single act of voting for a par-
ticular candidate on a particular day. Even assuming arguendo that an
implicit amendment provides a more expedient means of effectuating
constitutional change desired by the people, is it normatively desirable
if it encourages greater political lethargy? Is it more "democratic" in
the long run? If democracy is about more than merely a head count of
those who bother to show up at the polls, if it is about encouraging citi-
zens to make their voices heard on issues of great importance to them,
the answer to these questions is "no." Because Professor Ackerman's
implicit amendment theory may discourage sustained political activity
and expression, it is arguably less, not more, democratic than the proc-
ess of constitutional change required by Article V.
Whatever the reason for the New Deal generation's failure to pass
an explicit constitutional amendment, however, one thing is clear: the
failure to even begin a serious effort for ratification of an explicit con-
stitutional amendment indicates that "We the People" were ambivalent
about the issue. It indicates, contrary to Professor Ackerman's sugges-
tion, that Americans of the mid-1930s were not a mobilized citizenry
233. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 48-49.
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desirous of implementing the New Deal at any cost. The strong oppo-
sition to FDR's Court Packing Plan-including vocal opposition by
former FDR loyalists-reaffirms this conclusion. T4 There is simply no
indication, in short, that the American people gave FDR a blank check
to implement the New Deal in any way possible. The Supreme Court's
"switch in time," therefore, is not a reflection of the desires of a mobi-
lized supermajority, not deeply rooted in democracy, and therefore not
deserving of constitutional amendment status to be revered by future
generations.
E. Federalism in the Constitutional Amendment Process
Another possible explanation for the failure to propose or ratify an
explicit constitutional amendment implementing the New Deal is the
federalist structure of Article V. Under Article V, states play an inte-
gral role in the constitutional amendment process.23 While proposal of
a constitutional amendment may be made either by a two-thirds vote of
Congress or upon application of two-thirds of the states for a constitu-
tional convention, ratification can only occur one way: by three-
quarters vote of the states, either acting through their state legislatures
or through state constitutional conventions.236
Explicit constitutional amendments to expand national power are
particularly difficult to obtain, 37 precisely because Article V requires
the states to consent to all constitutional amendments by three-quarters
ratification. Thus, even if FDR had succeeded in convincing two-thirds
of Congress to propose an explicit constitutional amendment expanding
congressional power to implement the New Deal, such an amendment
would have faced an uphill battle at the ratification stage, because it
was not clear that the states (and the citizens living in them) wanted to
give their national government such an extreme authorization of power.
Within a week of the announcement of the Court Packing Plan, for
example, both houses of the state legislatures of Kansas, Maine and
New Hampshire, as well as the Connecticut House and the Texas Sen-
ate, adopted formal resolutions opposing the plan.23' The opposition
234. See sources cited supra notes 185-197 and accompanying text.
235. U.S. CONST. art. V.
236. Id.
237. Although not impossible, as evidenced most obviously by the Reconstruction
Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV.
238. Georgian Selected to Direct House Opposition to Roosevelt Plan For Enlarged
Supreme Court, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 10, 1937, at A3; Two Legislatures Vote Protest to
Syracuse Law Review
emanated from Democratic as well as Republican legislators, providing
further confirmation that many New Dealers who supported FDR in
1936 were not supportive of his attempt to circumvent Article V.239
Why states should have been so hostile to the Court Packing Plan
is rather obvious. If Congress enacted the Plan, FDR would be given
authority to pack the Supreme Court with Justices who could be ex-
pected to uphold the constitutionality of New Deal legislation. If the
New Deal legislation were upheld, furthermore, national power-
particularly the commerce power-would be considerably expanded
and state power commensurately contracted. 240 Thus, states had as
much to fear from the Court Packing Plan as they did from an explicit
New Deal amendment, and their opposition could be expected equally
as to both.24' One Radical Party Congressman from North Dakota, Ger-
ald P. Nye, echoed the predictable opposition of states by declaring, "I
know that my state would not countenance any such centralization of
power over intrastate business as now evidently contemplated, and I do
not believe another state in the Union would.2 42
Professor Ackerman would prefer to eliminate direct state in-
volvement in the constitutional amendment process. Under either his
explicit alternative to Article V or his implicit amendment theory, states
would have neither proposal nor ratification power.243 Under his prof-
fered explicit revision to Article V, the President alone would have the
Court Change, WASH. POsT, Feb. 11, 1937, at A3.
239. See Opposition from the States, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1937, at A8. Indeed, the
editors of the Post noted that "[t]he Texas Legislature has condemned the [Court Packing]
scheme just about as emphatically as that State approved the re-election of President Roo-
sevelt three months ago." Id.
240. A Washington Post editorial put it this way:
The States have good reason to be perturbed by the President's plan... [Tihe is-
sue on which Administration acts have been most frequently held unconstitutional
is the division of powers between the Federal and State governments. Various
addresses and official acts of the President give rise to the assumption that his
purpose in seeking a change in the membership of the Supreme Court is to make
possible the extension of national power without an amendment to the Constitu-
tion. That is a matter of direct concern of the State legislatures that may well en-
gage their attention....
Id.
241. Indeed, states may have had more to fear from the Court Packing Plan because
their Representatives and Senators in Congress had shown "unusual susceptibility to execu-
tive influence." Id. Thus, states had greater and more direct control over the ratification of
an explicit amendment than they would have had over congressional deliberations of the
Court Packing Plan.
242. Congress Split Over President's Views, CHI. TRMUNE, June 1, 1935, at A2.
243. See supra Part III.C.
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power to propose constitutional amendments and such proposed
amendments could be ratified only upon three-fifths support of voters in
two succeeding Presidential elections.244 And under Ackerman's im-
plicit amendment theory, constitutional amendments are the byproduct
of an institutional struggle amongst the three branches of the national
government, with the states having no voice at all.245 Thus, in order to
assess the normative desirability of Professor Ackerman's theory, it is
essential to determine whether preserving a role for the states in the
constitutional amendment process is itself normatively desirable.
Why would it be desirable to ensure that states have a role in pro-
posing or ratifying constitutional amendments? The historical docu-
ments relating to the Constitutional Convention do not shed much light
on this question. With regard to the proposal power, the most extensive
discussion came during the last week of the convention when Alexan-
der Hamilton (a Federalist) stated that Congress-not just state legisla-
tures--ought to be given the power to propose amendments.246 Thus, it
appears that the delegates to the Convention simply assumed, without
any debate, that the states would have the power to propose constitu-
tional amendments. This lack of debate is not particularly surprising.
After all, one of the chief reasons the Constitutional Convention was
called was that the Articles of Confederation's procedures for amend-
ment proved woefully ineffective as a means of bringing about desired247
changes. Specifically, Article Thirteen of the Articles of Confedera-
tion had two primary defects: (1) it required unanimity before amend-
ments could be effective; and (2) it granted the power to propose
244. For the full text of Ackerman's proffered alternative to the current Article V, see
supra Part III.C. Interestingly, Professor Ackerman does not say whether he intends his
explicit alternative to be a substitute for, or an addition to, the existing Article V. See
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 54-56.
245. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 48-49.
246. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTIUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 539 (Gaillard Hunt & James
Brown Scott eds., Greenwood Press 1970) (Madison reported that Hamilton stated, "The
State Legislatures will not apply for alterations [i.e., amendments] but with a view to in-
crease their own powers. The National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be
the most sensible to the necessity of amendments, and ought also to be empowered, when-
ever two thirds of each branch should concur to call a Convention. There could be no dan-
ger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in the case.").
247. RicaRD B. BERNSTEIN, AMENDING AMERICA 15-16 (Times Books, Random
House 1993); MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTrrLON OF THE UNITED STATES
51 (Yale Univ. Press 1913); Doyle W. Buckwalter, Constitutional Conventions & State
Legislators, 20 EMORY J. PUB. L. 543, 543 (1971).
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amendments exclusively to Congress. 248 Article V rectified both of
these defects.
None of the twenty-seven amendments enacted via Article V has
been proposed by a constitutional convention convened at the request of
two-thirds of the states (they have all gone the "easier route" of being
proposed by a two-thirds vote of Congress). 249 This does not mean that
the states have not played an important role in the proposal stage or that
their power to propose amendments is unnecessary. As one commen-
tator has noted, "[w]hen Congress is divided and unable to act, or if it is
slow to act, the state legislatures can [and have] act[ed] as a prod. 250
Two good examples of this coercive power of states in proposing con-
stitutional amendments are the repeal of the Prohibition (Eighteenth)
Amendment, which was initiated by the petition of five states,251 and
the Twenty-Second Amendment (limiting Presidential tenure to two
terms), which was initiated by the petition of five states prior to con-
gressional consideration.252 Even more significant is the example of the
Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, which provided for the di-
rect election of Senators by the people of the states.253 Because such a
248. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII ("[N]or shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the
united states [sic], and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state.").
249. See 143 CONG. REC. E1303 (daily ed. June 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Bliley of
Virginia). Interestingly, Congressman Bliley recently introduced legislation which would
amend Article V in order to make it easier for states to begin the amendment process with-
out depending on Congress. Specifically, the legislation would allow two-thirds of the leg-
islatures of the states to propose specific, identically worded constitutional amendments,
which, if not expressly disapproved by two-thirds vote of Congress, would then be submit-
ted to the states, three-quarters of which would have to ratify. H.R.J. Res. 84, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1997). The chief advantage of this revised approach is that it would permit states
to begin the amendment process without having to call a constitutional convention, an un-
tested mechanism widely viewed as presenting significant unanswered questions as to both
substantive scope and procedural form. See 143 CONG. REC. E1303 (June 24, 1997)
(remarks of Congressman Bliley); see also LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF
THE FEDERAL CONsTrnION 40-48 (Callaghan & Co. 1942); Buckwalter, supra note 247, at
549-561.
250. Fred P. Graham, The Role of the States in Proposing Constitutional Amendments,
49 A.B.A.J. 1175, 1176 (1963).
251. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE
V, 73 (A.B.A. Special Constitutional Convention Study Comm. 1974) [hereinafter
AMENDMENT OF THE CONsTrruTION.]; Buckwalter, supra note 247, at 548; cf Graham, su-
pra note 250, at 1176 (stating that four states had so petitioned).
252. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION., supra note 249, at 73-74; Buckwalter, supra
note 247, at 548; Graham, supra note 250, at 1178 n.20.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1. Prior to the adoption of the 17th Amendment,
Senators were chosen by the legislatures of the states. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3.
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constitutional amendment did not serve the self-interest of the sitting
Senators, congressional proposal was not immediately forthcoming. It
was not until twenty-three state legislatures had petitioned for such a
constitutional amendment that Congress reluctantly acquiesced and
proposed a direct-election amendment.254
It should also be remembered that the Anti-Federalists harbored
deep suspicion towards the new national government and they insisted,
throughout the Convention, that the states' voices be heard in important
governmental decisions.2 55 Article V attempted to palliate this suspi-
cion by providing two explicit assurances. 6 First, it provided a guar-
antee that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate. 25 7 Secondly, and more importantly, Article V
stated that states-and only the states-held the power to ratify pro-
posed constitutional amendments.258
Giving the states the exclusive power of ratification is important in
several respects. Perhaps the most important benefit obtained by per-
mitting states to ratify proposed constitutional amendments is that it
provides a necessary check on national power. Specifically, if the
states did not hold the ratification power, certain states or regions of the
country could more easily be disadvantaged, perhaps even abolished
altogether. Indeed, as Governor of New York, FDR himself acknowl-
edged this normatively desirable characteristic of federalism in a na-
tional radio address in which he stated:
The whole success of our democracy has not been that it is a democ-
racy wherein the will of a bare majority of the total inhabitants is
imposed upon the minority, but because it has been a democracy
where, through a dividing of government into units called States, the
rights and interests of the minority have been respected and have al-
ways been given a voice in the control of our affairs. This is the
254. Graham, supra note 250, at 1178; see also AMENDMENT OF THE CONsTrrUTON,
supra note 251, at 72 (stating that from 1901 to 1911, a total of 30 states adopted 69 peti-
tions for a constitutional convention on this issue).
255. See generally THE ESSEN 'IAL ANTIFEDERALIST (W.B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds.,
Univ. Press of Am. 1985); The STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM & TM CON-
STITUTION (Alpheus Thomas Mason ed., Oxford Press 1972).
256. U.S. CONST. art. V.
257. Id. Article V also contains another entrenchment provision which preserves state
power, albeit in a temporally limited fashion, to retain slavery: "[p]rovided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in




principle on which the little State of Rhode Island is given just as
large a voice in our national Senate as the great State of New York.
The moment a mere numerical superiority by either States or vot-
ers in this country proceeds to ignore the needs and desires of the
minority, and, for their own selfish purposes or advancement, ham-
per or oppress the minority, or debar them in any way from equal
privileges and equal rights-that moment will mark the failure of our
constitutional system.25
Thus, for example, suppose a constitutional amendment is pro-
posed which would abolish ten states in the American heartland-
Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Missouri,
Montana, Iowa, Oklahoma and Wyoming,-and turn them into a giant,
population-barren landfill for the use of the remaining forty states. Un-
der Article V as it exists today, such a proposal would have to be rati-
fied by three-quarters of the states, acting either via their state legisla-
tures or state conventions. This means that the proposed amendment
could be defeated by a mere thirteen states. Undoubtedly, the ten states
targeted for abolition would refuse to ratify the amendment. Thus, if
they could convince a mere three additional sister states-say, perhaps
the bordering states of Idaho, Utah and New Mexico, to name only a
few of the potential candidates-to reject the proposed amendment, it
would fail.
Contrast this likely outcome of defeat with the likely outcome un-
der Professor Ackerman's implicit amendment theory. Imagine that the
scarcity of land for waste dumping became an issue seized by Party X in
the 2008 elections. Moreover, Party X's presidential candidate runs on
a platform which advocates abolishing the heartland to make much
needed room for the country's growing waste. Party X's presidential
candidate then becomes the New President and at the President's re-
quest, Congress immediately passes a law abolishing the ten states, and
turns them into a landfill. The Supreme Court, however, then rules that
this law is unconstitutional.
Assume further that as the 2012 Presidential election nears, the
country's waste problem is growing increasingly severe. The President
runs for re-election, again asking the citizens to support him in his ef-
fort to implement his plan for a national landfill in the heartland and be-
259. FDR's speech occurred on March 2, 1930, and was reprinted in Franklyn Walt-
man, Politics & People: Centralization of Power in U.S. Held Road to Oligarchy in Ad-
dress of Greatly Admired Political Authority, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1937, at A2.
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rating the Supreme Court's decision as wrong, both as a matter of con-
stitutional law and modem necessity. The President wins re-election by
a landslide, sweeping into Congress on his coattails a decisive majority
for Party X. The Party X-dominated Congress quickly passes another
law abolishing the ten states and declaring the area a national landfill.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court has a "switch in time" and rules
that the law is now constitutional.
According to Professor Ackerman, this course of events-
essentially just a futuristic twist on his account of the New Deal-has
created a legitimate, implicit constitutional amendment which permits
the abolition of the ten states. Thus, while the procedures in Article V
would likely have resulted in a defeat for this kind of constitutional
change, Professor Ackerman's implicit amendment theory results in
success. The net effect of such a nationalistic amendment process is
that the interests of the citizens living in these ten states have been
trampled upon with tyrannical disregard by actors within the three
branches of the national government. If you live in one of these ten
states, too bad.
The key difference between the Article V procedure for amending
the Constitution and Professor Ackerman's implicit amendment proce-
dure or his explicit alternative to Article V is that in the former, the
states qua states have a significant say-so, whereas in the latter, they do
not. Thus, under Article V, states are essentially entrusted to protecting
their own interests (and the interests of their citizens) via the require-
ment that three-fourths of the states must ratify proposed amendments.
Under Professor Ackerman's implicit amendment procedure, by con-
trast, the interests of the states (and their citizens) is entrusted to the
three branches of the national government, which has unchecked power
to oppress the states (and their citizens).
The practical differences in these two procedures for constitutional
amendment are potentially quite significant. Article V, by providing a
meaningful role for the states in the proposal and ratification stages of
the constitutional amendment process, provides an incentive to expedi-
tious proposals and a strong disincentive to the disadvantaging of states
and regions, thereby fostering the unity of the states and the perpetua-
tion of the union. Because neither Professor Ackerman's implicit
amendment theory nor his explicit alternative to Article V provides any
role for the states in the amendment process, they are normatively un-
desirable.
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IV. THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: BEGINNING OF A JUDICIAL
"REPEAL" OF THE IMPLICIT TWENTY-EIGHTH AMENDMENT?
Considering how far we have strayed from the Founders' vision in
our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the question naturally arises as to
whether we can ever go back. Richard Epstein, for example, asserts
that "[i]t is far easier to keep power from the hands of government offi-
cials than it is to wrest it back from them once it has been conferred.
We have had our chance with the [C]ommerce [C]lause, and we have
lost it."
260
To be sure, the legal realist will argue that an outcome-oriented
Court can do whatever it wants, whenever it wants. But returning to
our constitutional roots in the Commerce Clause arena is much more
complicated than a matter of technical power and a will to exercise it.
Literally hundreds, perhaps thousands, of national laws are grounded in
the Commerce Clause.261 It is, by far, the single largest source of power
of the modem national government. To tinker with the scope of the
commerce power, therefore, potentially places the legitimacy of these
laws-and therefore much of the national government itself-in jeop-
ardy.
A. United States v. Lopez
Despite this risk, in its 1995 United States v. Lopez decision, the
Supreme Court invalidated-for the first time since the New Deal-a
national law as exceeding the commerce power.262 The law that was
invalidated, the Gun-Free School Zones Act, made it a federal crime for
"any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or
that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the
individual knows, or has reason to believe, is a school zone. 263 The de-
fendant, twelfth grader Alfonso Lopez, Jr., had clearly violated the fed-
eral law by carrying a loaded .38 caliber handgun to school with him
that day.264 His only argument for freedom was, to say the least, a long
shot: to argue that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded the com-
260. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 1455.
261. Most significantly, perhaps, are the federal civil rights laws, which are grounded
in the Commerce Clause. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
262. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (5-4 decision).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
264. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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21merce power. 6 When the Fifth Circuit bought Alfonso Lopez's argu-
ment and reversed his conviction, legal scholars were surprised, perhaps
even amused.26 Yet, they were generally confident that the Supreme
Court would reverse, continuing its post-New Deal trend of upholding
congressional exercise of the commerce power under a rational basis
standard.
When the Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit and invalidated
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the decision shocked many for whom
the Commerce Clause had become, as Deborah Merritt put it, "an in-
tellectual joke. 267 Chief Justice Rehnquist, perhaps sensing the shock
waves that the decision would send throughout the legal community,
took great pains to cite every major New Deal opinion.268 Perhaps in an
effort to suggest that these opinions and other laws grounded in the
commerce power were not in jeopardy the court stated that:
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previ-
ously defined authority of Congress under that Clause. In part, this
was a recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way
business was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once
been local or at most regional in nature had become national in
scope. But the doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier
Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. But even these modem-
era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer lim-
its.
269
Having thus reassured the legal community that the sky was not
falling, the Lopez Court then assuaged the federalists:
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is com-
mercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncer-
tainty. But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers
enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated
powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits,
265. Id. at 552.
266. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
267. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 691 (1995). But see
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAIJD. L. REV. 1635, 1654-57 (1995)
(arguing that Lopez was consistent with a constitutional theory desirous of limiting special
interest group influence).
268. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555-56.
269. Id. at 556.
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congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause will engender
"legal uncertainty."... The Constitution mandates this uncertainty
by withholding from Congress a plenary police power that would
authorize enactment of every type of legislation.... Any possible
benefit from elimination of this "legal uncertainty" would be at the
expense of the Constitution's system of enumerated powers.
270
Lopez thus raises more questions than it answers, conveying a
message of simultaneous doctrinal evolution and theoretical devolu-
tion-an odd combination of progress and regress. On a cynical level,
one is reminded of Machiavelli's assertion that, in altering the law, one
must "retain the semblance of the old forms; so that it may seem to the
people that there has been no change in the institutions, even though in
fact they are entirely different from the old ones. 271
Doctrinally, the majority in Lopez sets out a tripartite framework
for analyzing Commerce Clause issues.272 Specifically, the Court says
that there are three categories of commercial laws: (1) those that regu-
late the "use of the channels of interstate commerce"; 273 (2) those that
"regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce" ;274 and (3) those that
"regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce." 275 Although the Court mentions the rational basis standard,276 it
appears that, with regard to category three-those laws which must
have a "substantial relation" to interstate commerce-the Court is, in
practical terms, engaging in a somewhat more rigorous review. After
all, requiring the government to prove a "substantial relationship" to a
legitimate governmental objective (e.g., commerce) is the classic judi-
cial parlance for intermediate scrutiny, not rationality review.277 If one
270. Id at 566.
271. NiccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE & THE DISCOURSES, 182 (RANDOM HOUSE
1940).
272. See infra notes 273-276 and accompanying text.
273. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
274. Id at 558.
275. Id. at 558-59 (citation omitted).
276. Id. at 557.
277. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (illegitimacy classifications
subject to intermediate scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender classifica-
tions by legislature must be substantially related to a legitimate governmental interest);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (same); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988) (stating that between the "extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny
lies a level of intermediate scrutiny .... To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory
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thinks about it, this makes sense: category three Commerce Clause
cases do not facially have any connection to commerce in the way that
categories one (channels of commerce) and two (instrumentalities of or
persons/things in commerce) do. Thus, under category three, the gov-
ernment must proffer something more than a mere rational basis. In-
deed, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act "is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any other sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms.' 278
Thus, as a doctrinal matter, Lopez is more properly labeled
"evolutionary" rather than revolutionary. Lopez merely says that if an
act of Congress, such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act, does not fa-
cially have a connection to the channels, instrumentalities, or per-
sons/things in interstate commerce, Congress will bear the burden of
proving a substantial connection to interstate commerce in order to
sustain it as a valid exercise of the commerce power.279 It establishes,
in effect, a "quasi-suspect class" of laws passed pursuant to the com-
merce power which do not have any facial connection with interstate
commerce. This quasi-suspect class---category three-must then pass
intermediate scrutiny to be upheld, meaning that the government must
prove to the Court that the facially non-commercial activity at issue
does, in fact, bear a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
The Lopez standard of heightened scrutiny for category three laws
appears to have its roots in the famous "footnote four" of the 1938 deci-
sion in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 280 In that footnote, Jus-
tice Stone suggested that certain legislative acts may or should be sub-
ject to review more stringent than mere rationality review.
281
classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective."). Ad-
mittedly, the Court's language in Jeter appears to have "upped the ante" in intermediate
scrutiny from a "legitimate" to an "important" governmental objective. If this is indeed the
case, perhaps it is better to label category three Commerce Clause cases as requiring some-
thing more akin to rationality review with a bit of energy applied, as, for example, the Court
used in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down a state
zoning law limiting the placement of residential treatment houses for mental patients as
violative of equal protection under rationality review standard). Whatever shibboleth one
chooses to place on the level of judicial review for category three Commerce Clause cases,
however, it seems clear that, whether the Court would admit it or not, something more vig-
orous than the toothless, government-wins-automatically rationality review is being used.
278. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
279. Id. at 562-63.
280. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
281. Id. at 152 n. 4.
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Specifically, Justice Stone stated that "[t]here may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality[, i.e., rationality
review,] when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
,,212 Tu,* e o cm ec[ajmendments .... Thus, if a law passed pursuant to the commerce
power appears on its face to have nothing to do with any of the enumer-
ated powers in Article I, Section 8, a fortiori it would, in the words of
Justice Stone, "appear[] on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, ' 283- namely, the Tenth Amendment, which reserves
all powers not delegated to the national government to the states.284
Under this reasoning, therefore, a law grounded in the Commerce
Clause which has no facial link to commerce whatsoever-e.g., the
Gun-Free School Zones Act-would appear to violate the Tenth
Amendment and would require more exacting judicial scrutiny. The
burden thus would rightfully fall upon the government to articulate a
substantial nexus to interstate commerce to validate it under the Com-
merce Clause.
This sort of heightened scrutiny for facially suspect legislative acts
is, of course, nothing new. It is precisely the sort of review afforded in
the equal protection context to laws which single out suspect or quasi-
suspect categories of individuals.85 It is also analogous to the Court's
long-standing tradition of reviewing with greater vigor those dormant
commerce cases in which a state law is facially discriminatory in its ef-
fect on other states.286 In such cases, the law is inherently suspect be-
282. Id. (emphasis added).
283. Id.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
285. See supra note 277 (citing equal protection cases imposing intermediate scrutiny).
286. The modem test in the dormant Commerce Clause area was pronounced in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), in which the Court stated:
[The] general rule can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a le-
gitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature
of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142. The test, although complicated, appears to be that a state law, even with a le-
gitimate purpose, will violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it discriminates against
other states, unless there is no other, less discriminatory alternative available for achieving
the legitimate purpose. This translation of the Bruce Church test appears to have been em-
braced in the 1977 decision in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm 'n, 432
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cause it seeks to obtain an unfair advantage for its own citizens at the
expense of the citizens of other states-precisely the sort of economic
balkanization and favoritism that the national government, through the
Commerce Clause, was intended to have the power to remedy. Like-
wise, in the active commerce category three cases, the law is inherently
suspect because it has no facial link to interstate commerce-precisely
the sort of activity that the state government, through the Tenth
Amendment, was intended to have the power to regulate. Thus viewed,
the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Commerce Clause are but mir-
ror images of each other: the former defines the boundaries of the Tenth
Amendment in light of the Commerce Clause, while the latter defines
the boundaries of the Commerce Clause in light of the Tenth Amend-
ment. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Court in Lopez, per-
haps unconsciously, took a step towards harmonizing the standard of
judicial review in the dormant and active commerce contexts.
Imposing a heightened standard of scrutiny for quasi-suspect,
category three cases effectively shifts the burden of proof onto Con-
gress to articulate a substantial interstate commerce nexus. Thus, rather
than simple rationality review, which presumes a legislative act is con-
stitutional, heightened scrutiny essentially presumes a legislative act is
unconstitutional, and asks the legislative body to prove otherwise if the
law is to be sustained.28 7 In order to meet this burden of proof, it then
U.S. 333 (1977), in which the Court stated:
[T]hat state legislation furthers matters of legitimate local concern, even in the
health and consumer protection areas, does not end the inquiry.... [T]he chal-
lenged statute has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate sales of
Washington apples, but also of discriminating against them.... [The state there-
fore bears the] burden [to] justify [the discrimination] in terms of the local bene-
fits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives.
Id. at 350, 353. Perhaps the clearest explanation of the level of review afforded in dormant
Commerce Clause cases came from Justice Brennan's majority decision in Hughes v. Okla-
homa, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), in which the Court invalidated an Oklahoma law banning the
export of domestic minnows. The Court declared:
[The law] on its face discriminates against interstate commerce.... Such facial
discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose,
because "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as leg-
islative ends." At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest
scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondis-
criminatory alternatives.
Id. at 336-37 (emphasis added).
287. This interpretation of Lopez would be highly analogous to Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, in which he ex-
pressed his belief that Congress should bear the burden of proving a substantial nexus of the
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becomes quite important for Congress to provide either an explicit in-
terstate nexus requirement in the statute, or findings that document how
the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, or both.
Indeed, the Lopez Court makes just this point, distinguishing the federal
statute outlawing firearm possession by a felon 8 by noting that
"[u]nlike the statute [outlawing firearm possession by a felon], [the
Gun-Free School Zones Act] has no express jurisdictional element,
which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that
additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce." 289 With regard to the importance of findings, the Court
noted that
[a]lthough as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative find-
ings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding
effect on interstate commerce, the government concedes that "neither
the statute nor its legislative history contains express.., findings re-
garding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a
school zone." We agree with the Government that Congress nor-
mally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. But to the ex-
tent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the leg-
islative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.
290
While reliance on findings and explicit statutory nexus may seem
regulated activity to interstate commerce. 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring) ("Congress must show that the activity it seeks to regulate has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.").
288. See 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a).
289. 514 U.S. at 562. An interesting post-Lopez question is whether the mere exis-
tence of an explicit statutory nexus, if factually satisfied, would be enough to sustain a fed-
eral law in the event of a facial challenge. In Scarborough v. United States, the Court up-
held a conviction under a federal statute which prohibits convicted felons from
"possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition," 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
upon mere proof that the firearm had once crossed state lines. 431 U.S. 563, 567 (1977).
The Government's burden, the Court stated, did not include having to prove that the defen-
dant himself moved the firearm across state lines. 431 U.S. at 575 n. 11. It is unclear pre-
cisely whether Scarborough is a statutory interpretation or a constitutional decision, but it
certainly seems to imply that mere movement across state lines would be sufficient under
the Constitution since the Court stated that the statute was to be construed to reach the lim-
its of the Constitution. Id. at 575. Interestingly, the Lopez Court-of which only two Jus-
tices were also on the Scarborough Court-never even mentions Scarborough.
290. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (citations and footnote omitted).
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formalistic, it is important to remember that the Court did not say that
either was required. Rather, the Court merely appears to be attempting
to provide Congress with some sort of blueprint for exercising its com-
merce power in a constitutionally valid way. It is, in short, telling Con-
gress that, if it wants to use the commerce power to regulate activities
that do not, on their face, have a link to interstate commerce, it is
walking on thin constitutional ice. Such laws inherently raise constitu-
tional eyebrows because, without a facially apparent grounding in the
commerce power, they implicate federalism. All the talk about findings
and nexus is, therefore, a prophylactic warning to Congress that such
laws may violate the Constitution and that, in order to avoid future in-
stances of institutional conflict, Congress had better dot its i's and cross
its t's.
Assuming Congress gets the message and provides an explicit
nexus and findings, does this mean that the Court will defer and uphold
the law? 291 The answer is unclear. On the one hand, providing such
high value to an explicit nexus and findings would seem to elevate form
over substance, providing no real substantive limits on the commerce
power so long as Congress jumped through these procedural hoops. On
the other hand, giving conclusive value to an explicit nexus and find-
ings would seem to devalue the Tenth Amendment.292
If the current Court is nervous that congressional exercise of the
commerce power is approaching a point where "We the People" would
not approve, requiring Congress to jump through the hoops of providing
an explicit nexus and findings may reassure it that this is not, in fact,
the case. Thus, by requiring these extra procedures, the Court is effec-
tively telling Congress that it must inform the American people as to
what it is doing and why it is doing it. If Congress provides an explicit
nexus and findings, it essentially engages in a dialogue with "We the
People," explaining to us why these extra federal laws redound to our
benefit, enhancing accountability and limiting obfuscation. It estab-
lishes, in essence, a procedural proxy for ensuring that, at least in the
291. Senator Kohl later introduced a Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995 which con-
tained both an explicit nexus requirement that the gun "has moved in or... otherwise af-
fect[ed] interstate or foreign commerce," and nine explicit findings of interstate nexus. See
S. 890, 104th Cong., § 2 (1995). Although the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Youth
and Violence held hearings on the bill in July 1995, shortly after the Lopez decision, no
further hearings were held. A companion House bill was introduced by Rep. Schumer of
New York. See H.R. 1608, 104th Cong. (1995).




commerce power arena, the underlying assumptions of Garcia-that
federalism concerns can be adequately safeguarded by Congress-are
worthy of continued judicial confidence.293
B. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho
In March 1996, a closely divided Supreme Court decided Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, a case presenting the question whether
Congress, acting via its Indian Commerce Clause power, may abrogate
a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.294 In holding that Congress
may not so abrogate, the Court explicitly reversed its decision in Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Company, rendered only seven years earlier.295
Thus, in a breathtakingly short period of time, the Court did an about-
face with regard to congressional power vis-A-vis the states, holding
that a statute passed pursuant to the congressional commerce power
could not trump an explicit constitutional amendment. 96
The Court in Seminole Tribe noted that its departure from the prin-
ciple of stare decisis was warranted because Union Gas was only a plu-
rality opinion which had "created confusion among the lower courts"
297
and, more importantly, because "[t]he plurality's rationale [in Union
Gas] deviated sharply from [our] established federalism jurispru-
293. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
294. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (deciding 5-4, with Chief Justice Rehnquist delivering the
majority opinion for himself and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas; Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented). The Eleventh Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
295. Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1118 (reversing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1989)). It should be noted that Union Gas involved an exercise of the interstate
commerce power, whereas Seminole Tribe involved an exercise of the Indian commerce
power. The Court, however, noted that this distinction made no difference because
[i]f anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of
power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Com-
merce Clause.... Under the rationale of Union Gas, if the States' partial cession
of authority over a particular area includes cession of the immunity from suit,
then their virtually total cession of authority over a different area must also in-
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dence .... .298 Seminole Tribe is therefore striking not only for the
speed with which it followed on the heels of Union Gas, but for the
palpable respect the Court accorded the sovereignty of the states, a re-
spect which had been eroding steadily since the New Deal. Thus, at its
core, Seminole Tribe scales back the commerce power from what it was
thought to be only seven years earlier in Union Gas.
A recent decision from the District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama is illustrative of the potential implications of Seminole
Tribe. In MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, two professors at a
state university sued their employer, alleging violation of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA).299 The university defended
the action, claiming that the federal court lacked subject matter juris-
diction to entertain the suit against the university (an arm of the state)
because of the Eleventh Amendment.300 The district court agreed, rea-
soning that the ADEA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause301
and that the commerce power after Seminole Tribe was not so extensive
as to permit abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment.30 2 The MacPher-
son decision provides a clear illustration of the contraction of the com-
merce power which accompanied the reinvigoration of the Eleventh
Amendment in Seminole Tribe. Thus, while some may dismiss Semi-
nole Tribe as a minor decision restricted to the narrow issue of sover-
eign immunity, it has very real and significant implications for the
commerce power because it takes power back from Congress that was
thought to be within the commerce power only a few years ago.
Seminole Tribe, moreover, has been recently expanded upon by the
Court's 1997 decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho.30 3 In
Coeur d'Alene, a Native American Tribe sued the state of Idaho, vari-
ous state agencies and various state officials in their individual capaci-
ties, alleging that it had the exclusive right to use and occupy Lake
Coeur D'Alene, and seeking various forms of declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.3 4 The state asserted that the suit could not be maintained in
298. Id.
299. 938 F. Supp. 785, 786 (N.D. Ala. 1996); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
300. 938 F. Supp. at 786-87.
301. Id. at 787; see also Equal E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983)
(holding that the ADEA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause power).
302. MacPherson, 938 F. Supp. at 788. MacPherson has been followed by the district
court for the District of Minnesota in Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Minn., 958 F. Supp. 439 (D. Minn. 1997).
303. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
304. Id, at2031-32.
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federal court due to the Eleventh Amendment. 3 5 The Tribe responded
that federal subject matter jurisdiction was valid pursuant to the doc-
trine of Ex Parte Young, which previously had permitted the mainte-
nance of suits against state officials in their individual capacities, so
long as the complaint alleged that the state officials were violating fed-
eral law and the relief sought was prospective in nature.3°
A five Justice majority in Coeur d'Alene held that the federal court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit, holding that the
"authority stripping" doctrine of Ex Parte Young could not be invoked
to grant such jurisdiction under the facts of the case.0 7 Specifically, the
majority held that resort to Ex Parte Young was unavailable, stating:
To interpret Young to permit a federal court-action to proceed in
every case where prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is
sought against an officer, named in his individual capacity, would be
to adhere to an empty formalism and to undermine the principle, re-
affirmed just last Term in Seminole Tribe, that Eleventh Amendment
immunity represents a real limitation on a federal court's federal-
question jurisdiction. The real interests served by the Eleventh
Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of
captions and pleading. Application of the Young exception must re-
flect a proper understanding of its role in our federal system and re-
spect for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious
fiction.
308
Although five Justices agreed that the substantive concept of state
sovereignty precluded the maintenance of the Coeur d'Alene's suit
against Idaho, no single rationale for this conclusion emerged.30 9 Spe-
cifically, two Justices-Rehnquist and Kennedy-reached this conclu-
sion by explicitly adopting a case by case, multi-factor balancing ap-
proach, requiring courts to consider whether there is an alternative state
forum available, the form of relief is sought, the nature of the case, the
importance of the federal right at stake, whether federal court jurisdic-
tion is necessary to vindicate federal rights, and the effect an exercise of
federal court jurisdiction would have upon state sovereignty.310 Indeed,
305. Id. at 2032.
306. Id. at 2034, 2043 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2047-48 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
307. Id. at 2043.
308. Id. at 2034.
309. Id at 2043; see also infra notes 310-314 and accompanying text.
310. Id. at2039.
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this last factor-the effect on state sovereignty-was derived from an
obscure implicit reference in Seminole Tribe to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, a case which requires the federal court to
consider if there are "special factors counseling hesitation" before im-
plying a private right of action against federal officials who violate an
individual's federal rights.31'
The three concurring Justices-O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas-
took issue with the principal opinion's transformation of Ex Parte
Young, asserting that the principal opinion unnecessarily muddied the
constitutional waters by substituting a multi-factor balancing approach
for the previously clear inquiry set forth in Ex Parte Young.312 Specifi-
cally, the concurring Justices concluded that "[o]ur case law simply
does not support the proposition that federal courts must evaluate the
importance of the federal right at stake before permitting an officer's
suit to proceed. 313 These three Justices, therefore, concluded that a
balancing approach was not required under Ex Parte Young; rather, the
Court's traditional two-tiered inquiry remains: (1) has an ongoing vio-
lation of federal law been alleged; and (2) is the relief sought properly
characterized as prospective.314
Given the divergence of opinion as to the rationale of the holding
in Coeur d'Alene, the question remains: what, if anything, did a major-
ity agree upon? There is some common ground that can be identified.
Five Justices agreed that although the case involved a request for purely
prospective relief, the suit was the "functional equivalent of a quiet title
action," which "implicate[d] special sovereignty interests," particularly
the interest of states in controlling navigable waters within their bor-
ders.315 The majority then characterized the declaratory and injunctive
relief sought by the Tribe to be "far reaching and invasive" because
311. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). The
Seminole Tribe majority cited the case ofSchweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), a case
considering the propriety of recognizing a Bivens action. However, as Justice O'Connor
correctly points out in her concurrence in Coeur d'Alene, 117 S.Ct. at 2047, the Seminole
Tribe majority's reference to Chilicky merely stated that "where . . . Congress has pre-
scribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily cre-
ated right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an
Ex Parte Young action" against a state officer." Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1118. Thus,
the divination by Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist of an intent to embrace a "Bivens-esque"
balancing approach through such an obscure reference in Seminole Tribe is quite a stretch.






[t]he suit seeks, in effect, a determination that the lands in question
are not even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State. The re-
quested injunctive relief would bar the State's principal officers from
exercising their governmental powers and authority over the dis-
puted lands and waters. The suit would diminish, even extinguish,
the State's control over a vast reach of lands and waters long deemed
by the State to be an integral part of its territory. To pass this off as a
judgment causing little or no offense to Idaho's sovereign authority
and its standing in the Union would be to ignore the realities of the
relief the Tribe demands.316
Thus, the majority concluded, the "dignity and status of its statehood
allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist
upon responding to these claims in its own courts, which are open to
hear and determine the case. 317
The concept of state sovereignty thus gained a substantive flavor
previously unheard of in the Court's prior Ex Parte Young jurispru-
dence. Although a majority of the Coeur d'Alene Court refused to
transform Ex Parte Young into a balancing inquiry, nonetheless it seems
clear that, taken in combination with Seminole Tribe, the concept of
state sovereignty has taken on a new vigor in the Eleventh Amendment
context, spilling into the void created by a slowly receding commerce
power.
C. Printz v. United States
The trend toward judicial diminution of the congressional com-
merce power continued with the June 1997 decision in Printz v. United
States.318 In Printz, the Court invalidated a key portion of the so-called
Brady handgun control law which required chief law enforcement offi-
cers (CLEOs) to make a "reasonable effort" to determine-within five
business days-whether prospective purchasers of handguns were le-
gally allowed to possess a handgun.1 9 In ruling that this portion of the
316. Id. at 2031-32.
317. Id.
318. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
319. Id. at 2383-84; Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922). Pre-existing federal law made it un-
lawful for numerous categories of individuals to possess a handgun, including: convicted
felons; fugitives from justice; individuals adjudicated to be mentally defective; illegal ali-
ens; unlawful users of controlled substances; individuals dishonorably discharged from the
military; individuals who have renounced their U.S. citizenship; or individuals subjected to
specified restraining orders or convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses. Id. at
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Act was unconstitutional, Justice Scalia, writing for the slim five-to-
four majority, held that it violated the constitutional principle of state
sovereignty (i.e., federalism).320
The Printz decision is significant in several respects. First, in a
pragmatic sense, it indicates that a conservative bloc of five Justices-
Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas-is willing to de-
fine and enforce meaningful limits on the congressional commerce
power. Interestingly, this five Justice majority is the same majority
which struck down the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez and denied
Congress the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity in Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene. Their emerging
view of congressional power is clearly more restrictive than any other
Court of the Twentieth Century, providing fuel to the speculation that a
broader constitutional movement is underway.
In a legal sense, the Printz decision is even more spectacular. Jus-
tice Scalia is careful not to rely on Lopez, mentioning the case only
twice-once in the body of the opinion and once in a footnote, and both
times citing to Justice Kennedy's concurrence rather than the majority
opinion.32' Instead, Justice Scalia prefers to invoke the Court's 1992
decision in New York v. United States as his primary authority, which
held that a federal law giving states the option to either "take title" to
in-state radioactive waste or pass state legislation for its disposal was
unconstitutional.3 2 The New York Court did not make clear the precise
basis for the unconstitutionality of the federal law in question:
"Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress'
enumerated powers [i.e., the Commerce Clause], or as infringing upon
the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the
provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government
established by the Constitution. 323 Thus, New York could be read as
establishing either a limit on the federal commerce power or as estab-
lishing a line of state sovereignty beyond which Congress may not go.
Either way, however, the end result was the same: a federal law was
§ 922(d) & (g).
The law was named for Jim Brady, a former a Press Secretary to President Ronald
Reagan, who was shot and seriously injured in 1981, when an assassin attempted to gun
down the President See Lizette Alvarez, The Supreme Court: The Reaction; Lawmakers
See Minor Defeat Over Checks of Gun Buyers, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1997, at Al.
320. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at2383.
321. Id. at 2377.
322. 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992); see also Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380-82.
323. New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
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rendered unconstitutional. The precise intellectual route taken to reach
such ends appeared unimportant, a theme which is echoed in Printz.
The dissent by Justice Stevens is not so subtle, explicitly stating
that the Commerce Clause provides "a sufficient basis" for upholding
the validity of the Brady Act.324 Moreover, the dissenters assert that the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, provides an
"additional grant of authority" which "is surely adequate to support the
temporary enlistment of local police officers in the process of identify-
ing persons who should not be entrusted with the possession of hand-
guns., 325 Thus, the dissenters' argument goes something like this: Con-
gress has a plenary power to regulate interstate commerce; handguns
are part of interstate commerce; therefore, Congress may direct state
executive officials to carry out a federal law regulating such interstate
commerce.
326
The majority, although not explicitly relying upon Lopez, none-
theless invokes its spirit in addressing the dissent's Necessary and
Proper Clause argument. The majority refers to the dissent's invocation
of that Clause to be a "resort[] to the last, best hope of those who de-
fend ultra vires congressional action ... , 327 The Brady Act, further-
more, was considered ultra vires by the Printz majority because it was
"fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty ' ,32' as set forth in various constitutional provisions, includ-
ing, inter alia, the Tenth Amendment, the limited enumeration of con-
gressional powers in Article I, Section 8, and-interestingly-Article
v.
3 29
In relying upon this broad concept of "state sovereignty," the
Printz majority therefore relies, in part, upon the rationale of Lopez. If,
as the dissenters asserted, the Brady Act was a constitutional exercise of
the commerce power, there would be no disagreement and the Act
would have been upheld. In holding the Brady Act unconstitutional, the
majority necessarily implied three things: (1) the Act, which was
grounded in the commerce power, was nonetheless beyond the scope of
the commerce power (ultra vires); (2) the Act was beyond the scope of
the commerce power (ultra vires) because it infringed upon the princi-
324. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
325. Id
326. Id. at 2386.
327. Id. at 2378.
328. Id. at 2384.
329. Id at 2376.
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pie of state sovereignty embodied in numerous constitutional provi-
sions, including, inter alia, the Tenth Amendment, Article I, Section 8
and Article V; and (3) the Act infringed upon the principle of state sov-
ereignty because it commanded state officials to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program, in violation of the holding in New York v.
United States.330 Number one is necessarily true because if it were not,
the majority would have simply agreed with the dissenters that the
Brady Act was a proper exercise of congressional power and proceeded
no further. But the majority did obviously go much further, articulating
once again a broad, substantive concept of state sovereignty which, by
implication, limits congressional power under Article I, Section 8, in-
cluding the power to regulate commerce.
Printz, thus, reveals a deep and fundamental schism between the
majority and minority on the issue of federalism. For example, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, asserts that federalism, as embodied in
the Tenth Amendment and the limited enumeration of congressional
power under Article I, section 8, cannot be reduced to a procedural tru-
ism whereby Members of Congress are trusted to adequately represent
the separate states' sovereign interests:
The great innovation of this [constitutional] design was that "our
citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one fed-
eral, each protected from incursion by the other".... This separa-
tion of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protec-
tions of liberty. "Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy bal-
ance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front. 331
Justice Scalia then quotes Madison's Federalist No. 51, which
proclaims that a nation encompassing dual sovereignty provides "a
double security.., to the rights of the people. The different govern-
ments will control each other, at the same time that each will be con-
trolled by itself." 332
Justice Stevens, writing for the minority, adopts the procedural
view of federalism pronounced in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority that "[a]part from the limitation on federal authority
330. 505 U.S. at 177.
331. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at2377-78.
332. Id. at 2378 (quoting TBE FEDERALisTNo. 51, at 323 (James Madison)).
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inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the prin-
cipal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."'333
The dissenters thus assert that because members of Congress are elected
by the people of the States,
it is quite unrealistic to assume that [members of Congress] will ig-
nore the sovereignty concerns of their constituents. It is far more
reasonable to presume that their decisions to impose modest burdens
on state officials from time to time reflect a consideredjudgment that
the people in each of the States will benefit therefrom.
4
Under this view, therefore, state "sovereignty" is only as extensive as
Congress says it is, since members of Congress can be trusted to act
with states' interests in mind.
In short, the majority believes federalism is a substantive concept,
whereas the minority believes it is merely procedural. 335 Furthermore,
the majority's view holds far-reaching implications for the Commerce
Clause and the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment.336 After all, the
majority concedes that the Tenth Amendment and congressional power
under Article I, Section 8 (including the Commerce Clause) are com-
plimentary concepts, one beginning where the other ends. 337 Thus, if
Congress has power to legislate under Article I, Section 8, then the leg-
islation will not infringe upon states' rights protected by the Tenth
Amendment. On the other hand, if Congress does not have the power
to legislate under Article I, Section 8, then the legislation infringes
upon the residual powers reserved to the States under the Tenth
Amendment.
Thus, if federalism is viewed as substantive, the Court must first
decide the difficult question of whether Congress has the power, under
333. 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985); see also Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
334. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394.
335. See id. at 2365.
336. See id.
337. The Court states:
Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's con-
ferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumer-
ated ones.., which implication was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's
assertion that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
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Article I, Section 8 (or some other constitutional provision) to enact the
legislation. Only then can it answer the question of whether a given
legislative enactment violates the Tenth Amendment. By contrast, if
federalism is viewed as merely procedural, then the Court does not
have to decide undergo these intellectual contortions, but can simply
dismiss a Tenth Amendment challenge on grounds that states' rights are
per se adequately protected by Congress. This latter approach
(federalism as a procedural concept) enables the Court to punt the more
difficult issue of the limits of congressional power, including the limits
of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
The Printz majority, by adopting a substantive view of federalism,
inherently draws an outer boundary on congressional power, requiring
courts, for the first time since the New Deal, to engage in a serious in-
quiry as to the proper scope of such power when faced with a Tenth
Amendment challenge. 338 It is, therefore, potentially a sea-change from
New Deal and post New Deal precedents which have effectively
granted Congress a police power and reduced federalism to a proce-
dural truism. If the Court continues along this path, the implicit
Twenty-Eighth Amendment may be soon be a thing of the past, a ves-
tige of a bygone, big-government-is-better-government era.
D. Synthesis: Judicial "Repeal" of the Implicit Twenty-Eighth
Amendment?
Are Lopez, Seminole Tribe and Printz the opening salvo in a
broader movement towards restricting congressional power-i.e., could
they mark the beginning of a judicial "repeal" of the New Deal Court's
implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment? Shortly after Lopez was decided
in 1995, most legal commentators dismissed it as no big deal, an iso-
lated spasm of federalism that would soon subside.339 Professor Ack-
erman, however, suggested that Lopez could "be one of the opening
cannonades in the cofiing constitutional revolution. 340
338. See id. at 2365.
339. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DiALOGUE 141 (1995) (opining that
the impact of Lopez "will be limited"); Stephen G. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 831
(1995) (noting that "conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the
pan,"); Fried, supra note 8, at 37 (calling Lopez "a modest and conscientious exercise of the
Court's power.... Far from striking out on a new course, the Court both adhered to and
refreshed tradition."); see also Merritt, supra note 267 (explaining the doctrinal impact of
Lopez).
340. Nat'l Pub. Radio, Morning Edition, Apr. 27, 1995, Transcript No. 1594-6; see
Syracuse Law Review
Viewed in isolation, Lopez is interesting, but not revolutionary.341
The initial post-Lopez years indicated that federal District Courts were
willing to read Lopez quite broadly, invoking the decision to invali-
date-either facially or as applied-numerous federal laws, including
the federal arson statute, 342 the Child Support Recovery Act,343 the
Freedom of Abortion Clinic Entrances Act,344 superfund liability under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA),345 and the federal robbery statute.346 However,
also Kevin Fedarko, A Gun Ban is Shot Down: A Historic Supreme Court Decision Opens
the Door to Redefining the Power of the Federal Government, TIME, May 8, 1995. at 85
(statement of Prof. Glenn Reynolds that Lopez "may be the most important case of the dec-
ade.... It redefines the nature of the Federal Government."); Jeffrey Rosen, Fed Up: Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 Justifiably Overturned by US. Supreme Court, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, May 22, 1995, at 13 ("[A]s well as being constitutionally defensible, the Court's
decision [in Lopez] should slow the political momentum behind some of the more reckless
proposals to expand federal powers over tort and criminal law in the 104th Congress.");
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AMER. PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at 27
(characterizing Lopez as a decision that "came closer to the kind of sea change [Planned
Parenthood v.] Casey said the Court should avoid" and suggesting that Lopez "squander[ed]
public respect and legitimacy by changing its interpretationt- of the Constitution so abruptly
that [it] appear[s] more politics than law").
341. See, e.g., Symposium: The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 633 (1996); Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 533 (1995).
342. United States v. Pappadapolous, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995); contra United
States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st
Cir. 1996); Reedy v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. Va. 1996).
343. United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd, 108 F.3d 28 (3d
Cir. 1997); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787
(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 115
F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997); contra United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bongiomo,
106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Reyes, Crim. No. 96-235, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20241 (D. Puerto Rico
1996); United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United States v.
Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
344. Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996); United States v. Wilson,
880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub
nom., Skott v. U.S., 117 S.Ct. 47 (U.S. 1996); contra United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d
913 (8th Cir. 1996); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996); American Life League
v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 55 (U.S. 1995); United States
v. Weslin, 964 F. Supp. 83 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. McMillan, 946 F. Supp.
1254 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
345. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996); rev'd, 107 F.3d
1506 (11th Cir. 1997); contra United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996 WL 637559
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1996); United States v. N.L. Indus., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996).
346. United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalid as applied).
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since this initial frenzy of invalidation, the courts of appeals have re-
versed the vast majority of these decisions, indicating great reluctance
to open the potential floodgates without further guidance from the Su-
preme Court.347
Although Lopez itself has had limited impact, when it is viewed in
conjunction with Seminole Tribe, Coeur d'Alene and Printz, a potential
new meaning emerges, suggesting that Lopez may be more than an iso-
lated spasm of federalism. Taken together, these cases intimate that the
current Court may feel little or no entrenched loyalty to the omnipotent
congressional commerce power created by the New Deal Court. Thus,
if one assumes the existence of the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment
(as does Professor Ackerman), one faces a quandary when assessing the
Lopez-Seminole Tribe/Coeur d'Alene-Printz triad. After all, if the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment gave the Congress a police power which is
checked only by the discretion of the national political process, the
Court's attempt to draw an outer boundary on this congressional power
is illegitimate, a form of constitutional infidelity. Thus, according to
Professor Ackerman, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, Coeur d'Alene and Printz
can be legitimate (and hence, deserving of fidelity) only if they can be
accounted for in democratic terms. In short, they would have to be the
result of a higher lawmaking movement, an implicit amendment of the
implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment.34
If, indeed, this triad of cases does signal the initial stages of a new
implicit amendment, it only serves to illustrate the inherent weakness
of Professor Ackerman's implicit constitutional amendment theory. If
we accept that the New Deal Court's decisions culminated in an im-
plicit constitutional amendment, we are faced with an obvious problem.
How do we define the substance of the supposed implicit amendment?
I have suggested in this article that the implicit amendment essentially
granted Congress a general police power-indeed, I have even given
the reader a textual version of this implicit amendment. 349 But who is
to say that my textual version of the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amend-
ment is accurate? After all, the sine qua non of an implicit amendment
is that there is no text to which one can refer for guidance. Thus, in or-
der to assess whether the Lopez-Seminole Tribe/Coeur d'Alene-Printz
triad constitutes an implicit amendment (or the initial stages thereof),
347. See cases cited supra notes 342-343.
348. See FOUNDATiONS, supra note 4, at 53, 284; Higher Lawmaking, supra note 4, at
82.
349. See supra p. 140.
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one must first determine whether these decisions are consistent or in-
consistent with the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment. However, be-
cause the Twenty-Eighth Amendment is implicit, how can one deter-
mine whether these decisions conform to it?
If one defines the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment as broadly
granting to Congress a general police power (as I have assumed), then
Lopez, Seminole Tribe, Coeur d'Alene and Printz appear to be incon-
sistent and hence, may mark the genesis of a new implicit amendment
of an existing implicit amendment. If, on the other hand, one defines
the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment in some narrower way, Lopez,
Seminole Tribe, Coeur d'Alene and Printz may not be an implicit
amendment of this implicit amendment at all; rather, they may be
merely a "clarification" of the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment.
The inherent problem, therefore, in accepting the notion of an im-
plicit constitutional amendment is that it provides us with no reference
point from which to assess whether future Supreme Court decisions are
legitimate or illegitimate. There is, in short, nothing to which we can
readily refer in making legitimacy assessments of implicit constitu-
tional law. An implicit constitutional amendment thus eerily takes on
the character of natural law: it is supposedly "out there," providing a
meta-principle upon which we are to base our substantive constitutional
law, yet it cannot be seen, and no two individuals will likely divine it in
the same way.
Professor Ackerman thus finds himself in a rather precarious
situation. As a constitutional democrat-specifically, a dualist-he
wishes to avoid the countermajoritarian difficulty and legitimate certain
judicial opinions on the grounds that they emanate from the popular
political will of "We the People." But in proposing his theory of im-
plicit constitutional amendment, he paints himself into an elitist, anti-
democratic comer. The New Deal Court's implicit Twenty-Eighth
Amendment is a paradigmatic example. Did it culminate in an implicit
amendment that granted Congress a general, unbounded police power
in order to provide maximum national leverage to deal with the needs
of society? Or did it merely culminate in an implicit amendment to
grant Congress the power to regulate economic issues only? Or even
more narrowly, did it merely grant Congress the power to regulate cer-
tain categories of economic activities such as employment terms and
relations (i.e., wages, hours, and collective bargaining) and production
limitations (e.g., agriculture)? Or something else, perhaps?
Precisely because we cannot answer these questions with any pre-
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cision, Ackerman's theory provides the judiciary with a carte blanche to
tell us precisely what the New Deal implicit amendment was all about.
This, of course, gives the Justices the same kind of creative power exer-
cised by the Lochner350 Court and so roundly condemned by the New
Deal Court. It is, in essence, horribly anti-democratic-as much, or
more so, than simply accepting the fact that the Court was not designed
to be a democratic institution.
Because an implicit amendment is so amorphous a concept, we
cannot say, until perhaps Professor Ackerman tells us, whether the
Lopez-Seminole Tribe/Coeur d'Alene-Printz triad is part of a higher
lawmaking movement which may culminate in a "repeal" or modifica-
tion of the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment. We can say, however,
that these cases are arguably reflections of a broad political movement
toward federalism and away from the concept of an omnipotent national
government. The 1980 presidential election of Ronald Reagan was a
landslide which triggered the so-called "Reagan Revolution" of the
1980s, the primary theme of which was a resurgence of interest in
states' rights and smaller national government.351 While Professor
Ackerman concedes that the Reagan election was not in itself a consti-
tutional moment, the neo-federalism movement begun by Reagan has
continued unabated into the 1990S.352 The Republican takeover of
Congress in 1994 accomplished largely on the "Contract with Amer-
ica," 353 which included many anti-nationalist, pro-federalist initiatives,
such as a ban on unfunded state mandates354 and term limits for mem-
bers of Congress. 5  Indeed, Lopez was even argued before the Su-
preme Court on election day 1994-the very day that the Republicans
350. 198 U.S. 45.
351. See generally John W. Mashek, Massive Shift to Right Story of '80 Elections,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 17, 1980, at 26; see also Peter Goldman, The Republican
Landslide, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1980, at 27 (stating that Reagan took 51% of the popular
vote and 483 electoral votes, comparted to 41% and 49 electoral votes for incumbent Presi-
dent Carter).
352. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 51, 56.
353. For a general summary of the Contract's major provisions, see the Republican
National Committee's homepage at http://www.mc.org/school/contract.html; see also Ken-
neth J. Cooper, GOP Offers a "Contract" To Revive Reagan Years, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
1994, at Al; David E. Rosenbaum, Republicans Offer Voters a Deal for Takeover of House,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1994, at A16.
354. A version of this plank of the Contract With America platform was enacted into
law in 1995. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
355. In 1995, the Court held that the imposition of term limits-whether at the state or
national level-violated various provisions of the Constitution. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
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swept Congress clutching their "Contract with America.
356
But even if one accepts that the Lopez-Seminole Tribe/Coeur
d'Alene-Printz triad represents a fundamental change in the Court's
view of federalism-from procedural to substantive-it appears that, at
most, America is in only the earliest phase of Professor Ackerman's
four-step "higher lawmaking" process. Specifically, Professor Acker-
man's first step is an "impasse" among the branches of the national
government, an intense disagreement between, say, the Court and Con-
gress as to a fundamental issue of law or authority.5 7 Are the Court and
the Congress currently at such an impasse? Perhaps not yet. While the
Court does appear to be increasingly willing to invalidate congressional
legislation, it is not yet clear whether this amounts to a sufficiently seri-
ous challenge to congressional authority to satisfy Professor Ackerman.
Even assuming, arguendo, that one could characterize the current
Court-Congress relationship as at an "impasse" with regard to congres-
sional power, it seems reasonable to conclude that the second phase of
Professor Ackerman's four-step schema has not yet occurred: namely, a
decisive electoral victory for the proponents of reform.58 While the
election of President Reagan in 1980 was certainly a "decisive" elec-
tion, it occurred seventeen years ago, and therefore cannot serve as the
decisive electoral victory envisioned by Professor Ackerman. In other
words, because step two (decisive electoral victory) presumably must
occur after step one (interbranch impasse), one must assume that the
1980 election would not count. And it seems improbable that the Presi-
dential elections of 1984, 1988, 1992 or 1996 could be classified as
"decisive" electoral victories, much less decisive electoral victories for
a party advocating revolutionary reform.
The only national election that has the potential for serving as the
requisite decisive electoral victory is the election of 1994, in which the
Republicans regained control of both houses of Congress. '9 However,
was the 1994 election "decisive" enough? It seems unlikely. While the
Republicans did gain forty-nine House and nine Senate seats in 1994,
their margin of control was quite thin.360 Moreover, the 1996 elections
356. See Tushnet; supra note 17, at 845.
357. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 49.
358. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 49.
359. Howard Fineman, Revenge of the Right, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1994, at 37.
360. Id. (stating that the resulting Senate division was 53 Republicans, 47 Democrats,
and the House division was 227 Republicans, 199 Democrats).
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showed marginal increases for the Democrats,361 further suggesting a
lack of the requisite "decisiveness" to satisfy Professor Ackerman's
second step.
Thus, if a higher lawmaking movement is to occur, a decisive
electoral victory should come soon, perhaps in the year 2000. The im-
portant point is that, according to Professor Ackerman's four-step
schema, we are not now living in a constitutional moment. The net re-
sult is that, absent such a period of higher lawmaking activity, Professor
Ackerman's implicit amendment theory, by definition, brands the
Lopez-Seminole TribeiCoeur d'Alene-Printz decisions to be illegiti-
mate, countermajoritarian usurpations of popular political will. This is
so because they are retrenchments from the New Deal Court's implicit
Twenty-Eighth Amendment, an implicit amendment which Professor
Ackerman believes reflects the will of "We the People" and deserves
fidelity until such time as repealed by another implicit amendment.
Thus, Ackerman's theory suggests that the current Court's attempt to
back away from or "repeal" this implicit amendment is unfaithful to the
Constitution and undeserving of the respect of legal scholars and ordi-
nary Americans alike.
Is this a normatively desirable result? Should we embrace a con-
stitutional theory that mandates greater allegiance to an unwritten, in-
choate implicit amendment than to the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the written Constitution? Are judicial opinions abiding by such un-
written, implicit amendments (assuming they exist) really more
"democratic" than opinions abiding by the written Constitution? If I
have done my job, your answer should be "no" or at least, "not neces-
sarily."
CONCLUSION
Article V provides us with a relatively specific and elaborate proc-
ess for bringing about constitutional alteration. Nowhere in the history
preceding the adoption of the Constitution was it said that Article V
was not intended to be exclusive and indeed, Supreme Court statements
regarding Article V indicate that the Court itself considers Article V to
be exclusive. Yet constitutional theorists such as Professor Ackerman
contend that, because the Founders did not say that Article V was in-
361. See George J. Church, et al., The Balance of Power, TIME, Nov. 18, 1996, at 52
(stating that although the Republicans retained control of both houses of Congress, their
margins "appeared likely to be narrow enough to make 'control' a bit of a misnomer").
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tended to be exclusive, we can infer that there are legitimate, extra-
Article V means of amending the constitution.
Before we embrace such theories, we should stop and think very
carefully about the specific procedure embodied in Article V and ask
ourselves whether that procedure reveals a purpose. Specifically, we
should ponder whether Article V, which ensures that constitutional
amendment will be brought about only with the involvement of the
states qua states, was consciously adopted by the Founders as necessary
to protect against majoritarian tyranny and control regional divisions.
Thus, any constitutional amendment process-implicit or explicit-
which is not federalist in structure is undeserving of legitimacy.
We should also ponder whether supermajoritarianism support ex-
isted for the implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment and, if not, what long-
term effect an implicit amendment theory may have on democracy it-
self. Specifically, although Professor Ackerman endeavors to convince
us that the New Deal's implicit Twenty-Eighth Amendment is deeply
rooted in democracy, the historical evidence is to the contrary. The
New Deal generation was not mobilized in support of employing extra-
Article V means to implement the New Deal; rather, the historical evi-
dence indicates that this generation openly debated and approved of
Article V as the exclusive legitimate means to effect constitutional
change. Moreover, the enforcement and practical application of im-
plicit amendments is inherently elitist, not democratic. Implicit
amendments require, at their core, that nine unelected Supreme Court
Justices divine popularly desired constitutional change without so much
as the benefit of the written word. Any constitutional theory which in-
vites such Lochnerian behavior is normatively undesirable.
The desire to elevate "good" Supreme Court decisions to the level
of a constitutional amendment is understandable. Such elevation pro-
tects those "good" decisions from revision or repeal by subsequent
majorities in Congress or the Court that do not share the same values.
But the truth of the matter is that, unless law is grounded in the written
Constitution, it is not the product of higher lawmaking, but merely or-
dinary lawmaking and hence, is vulnerable to revision by later majori-
ties. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Lopez, Seminole Tribe,
Coeur d'Alene and Printz are, therefore, legitimate interpretations of
the Constitution deserving of our respect; implicit amendments, by
contrast, are not.
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